



European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions

# Mobility in Europe

Analysis of the 2005 Eurobarometer survey on  
geographical and labour market mobility

## Country codes

### EU15

AT	Austria
BE	Belgium
DK	Denmark
FI	Finland
FR	France
DE	Germany
EL	Greece
IE	Ireland
IT	Italy
LU	Luxembourg
NL	Netherlands
PT	Portugal
ES	Spain
SE	Sweden
UK	United Kingdom

### NMS

CY	Cyprus
CZ	Czech Republic
EE	Estonia
HU	Hungary
LV	Latvia
LT	Lithuania
MT	Malta
PL	Poland
SK	Slovakia
SI	Slovenia

### AC2

BG	Bulgaria
RO	Romania

### Abbreviations

EU15	The 15 EU Member States prior to May 2004
EU25	The 25 EU Member States after May 2004
NMS	The 10 new Member States that joined the EU in May 2004
AC2	Two acceding countries due to join the EU in 2007: Bulgaria and Romania

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# Introduction

The European Commission has designated the year 2006 as 'European Year of Workers' Mobility'. The purpose of the initiative is to inform EU citizens of the benefits and the costs of both geographical mobility and job or labour market mobility; the realities of working in another country or changing job or career; and the rights they are entitled to as migrant workers. The initiative also aims to promote the exchange of good practice between public authorities and institutions, the social partners and the private sector, and to promote greater study of the scale and nature of geographical and job mobility within the Union.

According to the Commission, there is ample reason for addressing the issue of workers' mobility from a Europe-wide perspective: mobility levels are low when compared with those in the USA (the usual benchmark for comparison). Although the comparison is not entirely straightforward (the USA is one country without internal borders, while the EU is a group of 25 individual countries), a general picture emerges of Europe having less mobility than the USA on any one of a range of indicators.

Generally, it is felt that Europe would benefit from substantially higher geographical and job mobility among its labour force. As Vladimir Špidla, EU Commissioner for Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities, stated: 'Europe is facing a combination of skills shortages, bottlenecks and unemployment. "Mobile" workers – people with experience of working in different countries or changing jobs – tend to be better at learning new skills and adapting to different working environments. If we want to see the number of workers in the right jobs envisaged by the EU growth and jobs strategy, we really need a more mobile workforce.'<sup>1</sup> Although this employment strategy applies to Europe as a whole, demographic trend scenarios indicate that some regions (e.g. southern UK, central France, southern Germany, western Austria and central Portugal) and certain countries in particular (e.g. Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands) are likely to face shortages of skilled labour and would thus benefit from higher geographical and job mobility (Eurostat, 2001; Doudeijns and Dumont, 2003).

In order to get a better view on the complex phenomenon of mobility in Europe, a Eurobarometer survey (EB 64.1), dedicated to geographical and labour market mobility, was conducted in September 2005. (Because of the limitations in usage of these data – the data only allow cross-sectional analyses, and not longitudinal analyses; the number of foreign-born inhabitants is under-represented in the survey population; and finally there is no data on job mobility within the company – it was necessary to make a selection of the available information on geographical mobility and job mobility in Europe.) This report sets out a descriptive analysis of the data collected and examines four key areas of enquiry.

## ■ EU policy

What is the policy baseline of the EU in terms of both geographical and labour market mobility?

## ■ Geographical mobility

What is the extent of long-distance geographical mobility in Europe? How great are the disparities between Member States in terms of their various mobility indicators? How many people intend moving to another Member State in the near future? What are their reasons for

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<sup>1</sup> Interview on European Year of Workers' Mobility 2006. Available at [http://ec.europa.eu/employment\\_social/workersmobility\\_2006/index.cfm?id\\_page=1](http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/workersmobility_2006/index.cfm?id_page=1)

changing their place of residence? In particular, the report examines whether further, more substantial migration of people all over Europe – particularly from the new Member States (NMS) to the EU15 – should be anticipated. Long-distance mobility is also examined from the perspective of a life-course model.

### ■ **Job mobility**

What is the level of job mobility in Europe? How great are the disparities between Member States in terms of job mobility? What is the profile of ‘mobile’ people and those who would rather hold on to a stable position? How many workers contemplate changing employer in the near future and why? To aid the discussion, the characteristics of mobile workers are analysed and the chapter examines such questions as whether ‘a job for life’ will continue to exist in the future and whether changing jobs occurs on a voluntary, rather than a forced, basis.

### ■ **‘Bounded’ mobility**

The discussion focuses on the interrelations between geographical and job mobility, introducing the concept of ‘bounded mobility’ to explain this complex phenomenon. Mobility decisions are not isolated decisions, but rather are taken within a predefined geographical and relational context. In order to understand related decision-making processes at the level of the household or the individual, the following basic questions are addressed: How do individuals generally perceive mobility? Can commuting be a functional equivalent to geographical mobility? Are the levels of geographical and job mobility related? Can countries be grouped according to different national mobility policies within Europe?

Analysis of these issues indicates that geographical and job mobility are complex matters. Mobility appears to be not always the result of individual choices. Indeed, mobility (particularly job mobility) is often found to be a characteristic of the more vulnerable groups in society. The analysis also shows that mobility-related decisions are the result of important and often difficult trade-offs. People attracted by the idea of making a long-distance move also report that they fear the loss of contact and support from family and relatives. It would also appear that what is good for the EU as a whole – greater overall levels of mobility – is not necessarily reflected in how individuals feel about mobility in their own lives.

During the writing of this descriptive report, new, more complex questions have arisen. They will be dealt with in the upcoming second phase of this project, which will analyse, in depth, the drivers and barriers to mobility and the consequences of mobility behaviour.

# EU policy background

# 1

There are three main rationales behind EU policy on mobility: freedom of movement, the Lisbon Agenda and immigration. A brief description of each is given below.

## **Freedom of movement**

Free movement for people is one of the most fundamental freedoms guaranteed by Community law; it is also a necessary precondition for building a single market. Freedom of movement includes the right for EU nationals to move to another Member State to take up employment and to establish themselves in the host country with their family members. Member States are precluded from directly or indirectly discriminating against migrant workers and their families on the basis of their nationality. EU migrant workers and their families are entitled to equal treatment not only in employment-related matters, but also in regard to public housing, tax advantages and social benefits. Removing barriers to mobility between and within Member States is at the centre of the renewed Lisbon Agenda (European Commission, 2006).

## **Transitional arrangements**

The transitional arrangements, set out in the Accession Treaty of 2003, allow limited derogation from the principles on free movement during a transitional period which will irrevocably come to an end on 30 April 2011 (European Union, 2003). The restrictions can only be applied to migrant workers and to obtaining access to the labour market. Once a worker has obtained access to the labour market of a particular Member State, Community law on equal treatment applies in terms of remuneration, other employment-related matters and access to social and tax advantages. No transitional arrangements are made for the coordination of social security schemes (European Commission, 2006).

The second phase of the transitional period began in May 2006. On 16 September 2005, a high-level group met to discuss the issue of 'Free Movement of Persons', with representatives of European and national social partners also invited. Many Member States reported that they had started the process of internal consultations to determine their position for the second phase. Together with the overriding majority of the social partners, many Member States stated that they were in favour of lifting the restrictions (European Commission, 2006).

## **The Lisbon Agenda**

In March 2000, the EU set itself a goal: 'to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion' (European Commission, 2003e).

Achieving these Lisbon objectives requires a skilled and adaptable labour force and a more open and more accessible European labour market. Six years after the setting out of the objectives, however, they remain far from being achieved (Council of the European Union, 2005). The overall economic and social context of the EU is characterised by a number of skills and labour shortages, competition for highly skilled workers in a globalised economy and accelerating demographic ageing (European Commission, 2003e). Even if the Lisbon employment targets are met by 2010, overall employment levels will fall as a result of demographic change. Between 2010 and 2030, at current immigration flows, the decline in the working age population of the EU will mean a reduction of some 20 million in the numbers of employed people: such developments will have a

huge impact on economic growth, the functioning of the internal market and the competitiveness of EU enterprises (European Commission, 2004b).

It is clear that to respond to these challenges and to the objectives set in Lisbon, the EU must first mobilise its current human resources. In this context, geographical mobility, labour market mobility and immigration policies are taking on new profiles. Greater geographical and job mobility should enable the European economy to adapt more smoothly and efficiently to changing circumstances and to drive change in a competitive global economy (European Commission, 2002c).

### **Main EU policy initiatives on mobility**

The European Commission adopted an action plan for skills and mobility in February 2002. The action plan was designed to contribute to the reaching of the Lisbon goals of more and better jobs, greater social cohesion and a dynamic knowledge-based society (European Commission, 2002c).

In its 2004 *Report on the implementation of the Commission's action plan for skills and mobility*, the Commission reviewed the action plan and policy initiatives taken with a view to its implementation (European Commission, 2004a). The report lists measures that have been taken to facilitate labour market mobility:

- making educational and training systems more responsive to the needs of the labour market;
- raising educational levels and reducing the numbers of people who leave school without formal qualifications;
- raising participation in lifelong learning, including skills development;
- identifying, assessing and recognising non-formal and informal learning;
- making qualifications more transparent and transferable (including the creation of the Europass portfolio of documents);
- promoting further investment in human resources in less developed regions of the Union.

In addition, the report lists measures that have been taken to achieve greater geographical mobility in the EU:

- many remaining administrative and legal barriers to workers' mobility have been removed;
- the coordination of cross-border social security systems has been modernised and simplified, and a European health insurance card (EHIC) has been introduced;
- occupational pension rights have been made more portable;
- the regulatory and administrative barriers to the recognition of qualifications for regulated professions have been lowered;
- the EURES network has been modernised and all job vacancies across the EU are now made available to jobs-seekers (EURES – European Employment Services – is an initiative designed to facilitate the free movement of workers within the European Economic Area);

- a one-stop European mobility information site has been created. Based on the EURES site, it also integrates the learning opportunities site Ploteus;
- the new European Employment Strategy (EES) has been revised to take better account of the needs of the enlarged EU.

Other measures have been proposed, including more transnational learning in other Member States. Further work is ongoing in promoting recognition of educational qualifications and competencies in non-regulated professions. However, little information is available on possible improvements in removing barriers to geographical mobility related to wage mechanisms, tax benefits and housing.

## Immigration

### **A common European immigration strategy**

The third rationale of EU policy on mobility relates to immigration. Recognising the impact of the demographic decline and ageing on the economy, the European Commission (2003e) highlighted the need to review immigration policies for the longer term. Although immigration in itself is not a solution to demographic ageing, more sustained immigration flows could be necessary to meet the needs of the EU labour market and ensure Europe's prosperity.

The need for a European strategic initiative is strengthened by the fact that, in its absence, migration flows are more likely to be able to bypass national rules and legislation. As a consequence, in the absence of common criteria for the admission of economic migrants, the number of third-country citizens entering the EU illegally and without any guarantee of having a declared job (and thus integrating into EU societies) will grow.

In a 2005 communication, the Commission argues that 'employment is a key part in the integration process. Access to the labour market is an essential ingredient of successful integration and a priority of the European Employment Strategy. To ensure this access, recognition of qualifications from third countries, making wider use of certificates obtained by immigrants from initial introduction and training courses, and ensuring the value of such courses as tools to access the labour market is essential' (European Commission, 2005b).

### **A common European asylum policy**

Asylum is a European internal problem that has to be tackled on a European level. In a Europe without borders, it makes sense to aim for an approximation of conditions: this would ensure that one country does not seem more attractive as a destination than another and would also ensure that wherever an asylum applicant makes an application they would be able to access support and have a fair hearing.

The key aims and principles of a common asylum policy were agreed in October 1999 in Tampere. Three legal instruments have already been created: the Dublin Regulation, the Reception Conditions Directive and the Qualification Directive. The adoption of the Asylum Procedures Directive will ensure that all procedures are subject to the same minimum standards throughout the EU.

# Geographical mobility over the life course

Throughout this report, a life-course approach is taken to the study of geographical and labour market mobility. Both types of mobility are related to life-course sequences and trajectories, including leaving one's parental home; starting a household/family of one's own; first job; combining work and childcare; job career and job-to-job transitions; and retirement. Approaching career development in general, and job mobility in particular, from a transitory labour market and life-course perspective has received much policy and scientific attention in recent years (Schmid, 2000; Schmid and Gazier, 2002; Van den Heuvel *et al*, 2004).

Analysis of the available data on geographical mobility from the 2005 Eurobarometer Survey (EB 64.1) shows that there are differences and similarities across EU Member States. (Countries vary considerably in labour force mobility trends and needs, as will be seen in Chapter 3.) Consequently, a comparative approach is warranted in understanding EU mobility patterns and workers' future mobility intentions.

The following topics form part of the discussion:

- development of a basic model of mobility trajectories over the life course;
- description of the first life-course mobility step – leaving the parental home;
- exploration of the level of geographical mobility over the next stages of the individual's life course;
- examination of the distances, both short and long, that Europeans have moved in the past, e.g. within/outside one's town, region and country;
- analysis of the motives for, and effects of, past mobility;
- review of possible future trends, as indicated by respondents' stated intentions to move within the next five years (again, within/outside one's town, region and country), indicating the mental correlates of future mobility likelihood and a first estimate of Europeans' potential for geographical mobility;
- finally, the summary of main findings puts the results in perspective and raises some interpretative and methodological issues.

Throughout the discussion, the main emphasis is on comparing different EU countries, with a special focus on long-distance mobility and on differences between (and within) the EU15 and the NMS. Findings are specified according to gender, age, education, employment status and household composition.


## A life-course model of geographical mobility

The focus of this section is on geographical, or to be more precise, residential mobility, i.e. people's movements from one place of residence to another. Although from an EU policy perspective a careful study of cross-border movement is clearly relevant, this discussion takes a broader view. The reason is that long-distance cross-border mobility is not a phenomenon on its own: it is one aspect of people's movements throughout their life course. Such movements include leaving the

parental home or moving house. They can be short in distance, as when a young person leaves the parental home to go and live elsewhere in the same city or town. Mobility can also involve long-distance movement – for example, when a person moves to another country. Long-distance movement, the argument goes, becomes more meaningful when seen from an overall perspective on geographical movement, one that includes movement over shorter distances.

Viewing such migration movements in a life-course perspective is very demanding of data since the timing of each movement needs to be analysed in relation to the individual demographic and labour market life cycle, as well as in relation to major life events. This, however, is not always possible with the data available. A true life-course perspective on geographical mobility requires detailed comparative panel data on individual movements. But with the 2005 Eurobarometer mobility survey, it is possible to present parts of the mobility path over the life course, as well as expected mobility in the (near) future. The conceptual model used is shown in Figure 1.

**Figure 1 Life-course perspective on residential mobility**



Notes: Horizontal line represents the respondent's career; vertical lines represent changes of residence.

The first major event, from a life-course perspective on residential mobility, is leaving the parental home. This corresponds to the transition to adulthood: it often marks the beginning of economic independence and is usually associated with being the first act of household formation in an individual's life (although the differences across EU countries are substantial as Iacovou (2001) shows). After having left the parental home, several other movements are likely. These will be driven by demographic events, such as family formation, family extensions (children) and family dissolutions, and by labour market events, such as a new job, the loss of a job or retirement. These are indicated by the vertical lines on the timeline in Figure 1. Although it is not possible to position these movements in time (findings from the Eurobarometer survey indicate only the year in which the person entered their *current* dwelling), information is available regarding the space in which the moves took place: whether it was a short-distance move (remaining within the person's region of residence) or a long-distance move (moving outside the region, country or outside the EU). Moreover, the survey findings also indicate the reasons for the movements – whether they relate to

demographic events, housing or employment. All these issues will be addressed later in this discussion.

In the literature on mobility, a distinction is usually made between stocks and flows. 'Stocks' refer to the number of foreigners in the total population and 'flows' refer to the inflow and outflow of the migrant population over time. The stock itself can change over the years because of these flows, because of naturalisation and because of demographic changes in the migrant population. Geographical mobility is the result of various flows: *immigration* (foreigners moving into the country); *emigration* (nationals leaving the country); *return migration* (nationals returning to the country); and *circular migration* (nationals who move back and forth between countries). Ideally, our concept of geographical mobility should distinguish among these various flows since both their reasons for moving and the consequences of their moving are likely to be different. However, due to data constraints such as small sample sizes and non-representative samples of non-nationals, it is impossible to do so in a reliable way and hence geographical mobility must be discussed in a more general sense.

Taking a life-course perspective on residential mobility, it is interesting to investigate whether or not people have intentions to move in the future and, if they have, where they intend to move to (see *Figure 1, right-hand side*). Such information might reveal how people are likely to use geographical relocation in response to changing circumstances in their personal lives or in the labour market. Although such intentions or expectations cannot be taken as hard predictors of future mobility, especially when it comes to long-distance moves, they might indicate new future trends in Europe. (Manski (1990) has shown that data on intention does carry information about subsequent behaviour.) In any case, the barriers to and incentives for mobility that people perceive, in combination with people's general views on mobility, indicate possible directions for both national and European policy directed at promoting workforce mobility. In this sense, the findings on, for example, the expectations of citizens of the NMS to move to other EU states are of crucial importance to the current policy and societal debate concerning the likelihood of future migration flows from the NMS to the EU15.

### **Start of geographical mobility career**


Seen from an overarching life-course perspective, the first basic geographical mobility transition at the individual level is leaving the parental home. In fact, increasing variation in personal decision-making with respect to leaving the parental home is one of the first signs of the destandardisation (or individualisation) of the personal life course in Western societies (Ester *et al*, 1994). The modern life course, according to sociologists, is directed by autonomy, emancipation and self-realisation (Inglehart, 1997; Ester *et al*, 2006). Starting a household of one's own, more or less independent of direct parental influence, is the first move in the sequence of personal geographical mobility trajectories. From an individual's point of view, this symbolises a major rite of passage and, for many young people, implies a delicate balance between a stressful life event and much-celebrated personal freedom.

The reasons for leaving the parental home reflect a variety of motivations. According to Aasve *et al* (2002), these may include professional reasons (beginning a career), educational aspirations (advancing one's studies elsewhere), personal relationships (marriage or cohabitation) or psychological desires (the need to be independent and live alone).

Previous research indicates that the average age at which young people leave their parental home is rising (Goldscheider and Goldscheider, 1999), but also that there are substantial differences between countries. Goldscheider (1998) showed that, between the mid-1980s and mid-1990s, the trend towards leaving home at a later age has appeared throughout Europe (as well as in the USA), being most pronounced in southern Europe. Looking at data from the European Community Household Panel (ECHP), Iacovou (2001) observed strong relational differences within Europe: in Nordic countries, young people leave home relatively early in the life course to live as single people, on their own; in southern European countries, by contrast, young people leave the parental home relatively late to live with a partner.

According to the Eurobarometer mobility survey, Europeans leave their parental home, on average, at the age of 22 years. As found in previous research (*see above*), there are large differences between European countries. In Figure 2, the boxes represent the range between the top and bottom quartile, and the median age (21 years for the EU25) is represented by a thick line inside the box.<sup>2</sup> Figure 2 thus provides, at a glance, a representation of the median age at which people leave their parental home *and* the distribution of that age. People leave home early in the Nordic and Baltic states (Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Denmark, Finland and Sweden); they leave home at a later age in Malta and in southern Europe (Spain and Italy), most probably due to the poor labour market situation for young people in these two latter countries. Moreover, not only do people in Nordic countries leave home at a relatively early age, but the variation of that age is also less (as indicated by the shorter boxes in Figure 2). The NMS are quite heterogeneous in terms of the median age at which people leave their parental home.

**Figure 2 Median age at leaving parental home, by country (years)**



<sup>2</sup> The median age corresponds to the age at which half the people have left the parental home and half are still at home. The lines out to either side of box indicate the spread of values as represented by 1.5 times the differences between the lower and higher quartile.

## Levels of past geographical mobility

The second stage in an individual's life course in terms of their geographical mobility is the sequence of subsequent moves after they leave the parental home. How mobile – or stable – are Europeans once they start a household of their own? Is this next stage one of experimentation, of fast sequential mobility? Or does their mobility career involve a limited number of geographical movements?

Previous research, mentioned above, indicates that geographical mobility is not a widespread phenomenon in Europe and mobility between the various EU Member States is of a (very) limited nature. This is due to a number of factors: there are clear institutional and legal differences between the Member States; moreover, the decision to move is affected by cultural barriers (such as language and customs) and by the social costs of leaving one's networks (family, friends and colleagues), as well as being strongly influenced by the life-course stage a person occupies (e.g. the presence of young children, having a working partner, the phase of one's working career) (Recchi *et al.*, 2003). The decision not to move, therefore, does not necessarily indicate an unwillingness to move, but probably reflects institutional and cultural factors, as well as the influence of networks and individual life-course trajectories and assessments.

In this section, the level or intensity of residential mobility in EU Member States is examined, i.e. the number of moves Europeans have made after leaving their parental home to start a household of their own. The analysis starts by reporting on the percentage of Europeans who have never moved after departing their parental home.

### Residential stability


Figure 3 shows that, on average, about 17% of Europeans have never moved after leaving their parental home – neither within nor outside their country of origin. By far the single most important reason stated by respondents for not having moved again after they left their parental home and formed their own household is their high level of satisfaction (63%) with where they presently live. The second most important motive is 'family' reasons (14%).

The EU mean figure of 17% is not, however, very informative since the cross-national differences are very large, ranging from less than 5% in Sweden, Finland and Denmark to some 40% and greater in Slovakia and Malta respectively. The Nordic countries display the smallest proportion of people that did not move after their first move out of their parental home, while a number of the NMS show high proportions of people not making any subsequent life-course moves. Again, however, it must be emphasised that the NMS are not a homogeneous category in this respect – countries such as Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania show greater mobility than, for example, Slovakia, Poland and Hungary.

### Frequency of moves

After making their first life-course move (leaving the parental home), some people settle themselves permanently at their new residence, while others change their residence several times over the next sequences of their life course. The average stay in each dwelling for the EU25 is presented in Figure 4, with an average mean of slightly under 10 years.


**Figure 3 Percentage of people who have never moved after leaving parental home, by country**



One has to note that older people have, by definition, had more opportunities to move more frequently than young people who have only recently left the parental home. For this reason, an index is used to measure the average stay in each dwelling, while correcting for age. For each individual (i), the average length of the stay in each dwelling is calculated as follows:<sup>3</sup>

$$\text{Average duration of stay in dwelling} = (\text{age}_i - \text{age left home}_i) / (1 + \text{frequency of moves}_i)$$

**Figure 4 Average duration of stay in each dwelling, by country (years)**



<sup>3</sup> Because the actual number of moves was not asked for in the Eurobarometer survey, the mobility intensity index is computed on the basis of the class average for the answers to the question on the number of moves since the respondent left the parental home: 'never' = 0; 'once' = 1; '2-4 times' = 3; '5-9 times' = 7; and '10+ times' has been attributed the value 13. This is rather arbitrary, but the mean number of moves in this class is unknown. We have experimented with other values for that class (12 and 15 instead of 13), but this does not affect the ordering of the countries on the index in any significant way.

The EU mean figure of slightly less than 10 years spent in each dwelling conceals a broad range across Member States, with above-average durations in southern European countries and in most of the NMS, and shorter durations in Scandinavian countries and in the Netherlands, UK and France. Except for Latvia and Lithuania, all the NMS have an average duration of stay per dwelling that is above the EU average (the EU15 are dispersed around the mean).

### Distance travelled in past geographical mobility

Europe has a long history of migration and mobility (Recchi *et al*, 2003). After World War II, the main direction of migration within Europe initially (between 1950 and 1970) was from south to north, with a wave of unskilled labour (mostly single men) moving from the poorer Mediterranean countries (mainly Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia) to the richer industrialised northern European countries. In essence, the nature of geographical mobility in this period was organised migration – initiated by industry and regulated by countries. The next stage, from the late 1960s to the 1980s, involved large-scale family migration (the wives and children of the first migrants) as it became obvious that the first wave of immigration had turned into permanent settlement.

Since the late 1980s, new forms of migration within the EU have emerged, including the migration of highly skilled workers between high-tech European firms, the rise in the number of asylum-seeking immigrants and the expansion of illegal immigration. According to OECD figures, the stock of the foreign-born population in the European Economic Area has increased from 4.8% of the total population in 1991 to 5.7% in 2001 (OECD, 2004). The bulk of foreign citizens living in Member States have come from outside the EU: intra-EU migration is a rather limited phenomenon.

A quite recent development is the migration of students and of retired people. Taking courses abroad is rapidly becoming a trend among European students: between 1987 and 2000, about 750,000 students took part in the Erasmus and Socrates programmes, which are designed to facilitate studying abroad (King *et al*, 2003). Retirement migration is an interesting form of mobility at the later stages of the life course of Europeans. In recent years, retirement destinations have become more diverse and extend beyond the local, regional and even national level to increasingly involve international localities, particularly in southern Europe (King *et al*, 1998 and 2000). The main pull factors are better climate, lower housing costs and general lifestyle improvements. International retirement migration has become democratised and is less elitist than it was some decades ago.


An important part of the questionnaire in the 2005 Eurobarometer mobility survey was devoted to the distance involved in past movements since leaving the parental home – whether the move was within the person's own town or city; outside the town or city but within the same region; outside the region but within the same country; to another EU country; or to a country outside the EU (see Figure 5).<sup>4</sup> As well as the distances involved, respondents were also asked about their motives for the move and the consequences for them.

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<sup>4</sup> Note that these notions of 'within town/city', 'within region' and 'outside region' are not further specified in the questionnaire and are left to the understanding of the respondent. This means that 'regional' as measured in our data is not necessarily comparable to other statistical sources, which generally use well-defined indicators for regions (e.g. NUTS levels in Europe).

Unfortunately, it is not known when exactly these moves took place. The questions were only asked of respondents who had left the parental home and who had moved at least once after that. People who had never left the parental home or who had never moved after leaving the parental home were counted as ‘non-mobile’.

**Figure 5 Past mobility, by distance of move (%)**



The observed pattern of past mobility as seen in Figure 5 is quite clear: the percentage of Europeans that has made a particular move decreases as the distance increases. Long-distance mobility is not at all common for Europeans: only 18% have moved outside their region, while the percentage for cross-border migration is especially low (only 4% ever moved to another Member State and fewer than 3% ever moved to another country outside the EU). This contrasts with the higher mobility rates found for short-distance moves: 32% of Europeans have moved within their own town or city, and almost a quarter (24%) have moved outside their town or city (remaining within the region). These figures highlight the importance of interpreting long-distance moves within the total spectrum of geographical moves.

These European figures can be compared with those from the USA. Data collected by the US Census Bureau in 2000<sup>5</sup> show that almost a third (32%) of US citizens live outside the state in which they were born: this is almost twice the level of regional mobility in the EU (18%). Obviously, distances within the USA are much greater than within EU Member States, so perhaps a better comparison would be to count the numbers of EU citizens who have lived in either another region or another country. The Eurobarometer survey data show that about 22% of the EU population has ever lived in another region or country. On the basis of this figure, the EU–USA difference in mobility is lower, but still substantial. However, it should be noted that movement within the USA takes place within the same country, language area and culture – not the case for intra-EU movement.

<sup>5</sup> <http://www.census.gov/main/www/cen2000.html>

From an economic point of view, it is expected that people move in response to changing economic circumstances, such as high unemployment and/or low wages. Hence, when the costs of mobility are low, people can be expected to move from regions with a poor supply of jobs to regions where the demand for labour is greater, in order to increase their employment opportunities. This mechanism should allow for an efficient allocation of labour and for the correction of regional imbalances in employment.

The gross regional mobility flow in the USA amounts to 3.05% of the working age population, while it ranges from 2.28% in the UK to 0.14% in Slovakia. These figures suggest significant differences between the EU and the USA: in the EU, regional imbalances are primarily absorbed by changes in participation, whereas they tend to be absorbed by regional migration in the USA (Decressin and Fatas, 1995). At least part of the EU–USA difference in mobility rates can be explained by the fact that the costs of mobility are likely to be higher in the EU due to language barriers, cultural differences, transferability of social security rights and recognition of educational degrees. (These perceived barriers to mobility are discussed later in this chapter.)

Thus, the conclusion must be that intra- and extra-EU mobility or migration is still a rather limited phenomenon. If people do move, it is primarily within their own town or region, and in more than nine out of 10 cases, within their own country. Overall, there is more geographical mobility in the EU15 than in the NMS. However, this finding should be treated with caution: it could reflect real differences across countries; however, it could be that the samples from the NMS are biased in the sense that eastern European citizens who have moved to other Member States are likely to be excluded from the sample – a selectivity bias. The Eurobarometer survey data are likely to underrepresent the true level of mobility: respondents who did move are neither included in the samples of the host country (due to non-representativity of the foreign population) nor in the country of origin (because they have left).

A breakdown of distance of past mobility for the main demographic characteristics is given in Table 1. (Note that the two categories of short-distance mobility – within city/town or within region – are combined in Column 2.) It becomes clear that gender differences are small in terms of distance of past movement. In terms of age, the oldest age group (people over 65) moved more within their town or city, but made fewer long-distance moves. But here, too, the differences are not dramatic. As expected, the youngest age group (which includes many students) is underrepresented in each distance-of-move category. As regards employment status, it appears that, in general, unemployed people – compared to those working or retired – have displayed less past mobility in almost all distance-of-move categories.

As the educational level increases, the percentage of people who report long-distance moves (i.e. outside the region or outside the country) also increases.<sup>6</sup> Results show that about 7% of the highly educated report having moved within the EU since they left their parental home, compared to 4% among the lower educated (this could often indicate a study period abroad). This confirms previous studies, which have found that more highly educated workers are more likely to be mobile on the

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<sup>6</sup> In the data, educational attainment is measured by the age at which the respondent finished full-time education. For ease of exposition, these ages have been recoded into levels. Those who finished before the age of 16 qualify as having a low level of education. Those who finished between the ages of 16 and 19 are said to have an average educational level. Those who left full-time education at the age of 20 or above are highly educated.

international labour market (Rodríguez-Pose, 2002; Salt, 1992).<sup>7</sup> During the 1990s, the demand for highly skilled professionals willing to move across borders grew substantially – particularly on the part of multinationals, but also in such sectors as research and development, IT, tourism and marketing. The globalisation of skills and competencies implies a wider geographical scope for jobs and careers – and consequently employment options – for highly skilled individuals (OECD, 2001). Willingness to move for career reasons, even over long distances and between countries, is much more part of the professional culture of highly educated workers than of less well-educated workers. The Eurobarometer mobility survey data confirm that younger, higher educated cohorts are more internationally oriented than the older cohorts. For these younger cohorts, being mobile, crossing borders, thinking globally and experiencing different cultures is an almost natural feeling and a part of the way they want to advance their career, skills and expertise (Miles, 2000; Ester *et al*, 2004).

**Table 1 Past mobility level in distance moved, by demographic characteristics (%)**

	Within city/town or region	Across regions	Within EU	Outside EU
<b>Total</b>				
EU25	53	18	4	3
EU15	55	19	5	3
NMS	45	9	1	1
<b>Gender</b>				
Male	52	17	4	3
Female	55	19	4	3
<b>Age</b>				
18–24	19	7	2	0
25–34	48	17	5	3
35–44	61	18	5	3
45–54	62	19	4	4
55–64	60	21	4	4
65+	59	20	4	3
<b>Educational level</b>				
Low or none	59	13	4	2
Average	56	17	3	3
High	54	27	7	5
Still studying	17	9	3	1
<b>Employment status</b>				
Working	56	18	4	3
Unemployed	49	16	4	2
Retired	59	20	4	3
Homemaker	56	16	5	2

Further investigation of the data also reveals that, not surprisingly, cross-border mobility is more common for foreign-born individuals than for nationals. Over one-third of all those who have

<sup>7</sup> Whether the resulting effect for Member States is a 'brain drain' or a 'brain gain' (Starck, 2002) cannot be estimated from the Eurobarometer mobility survey data. For this purpose, one needs reliable information of origin and destination of migration flows.

moved between countries were actually born in a different country. These are people who migrated to the country they currently live in. Almost two-thirds of foreign-born respondents report never having lived in another country after leaving their parental home. This illustrates how important family ties are as a ‘push’ factor in mobility: these people were born in a different country and came to their current country of residence as children (while they were still in their parental home) and have remained in that country ever since.

After these basic explorations, the next step is to analyse past mobility in terms of country differences (see Table 2). Is it the case that the EU25 countries vary greatly in past mobility, particularly over longer distances and across borders (both within and outside the EU)? Do some countries stand out in terms of a localised past mobility pattern? What is the position of the NMS? Are they much more heterogeneous than commonly assumed?

**Table 2 Past mobility, by destination and by country (%)**

	Within city/town or region	Across regions	Within EU	Outside EU
Belgium	62	14	5	3
Denmark	65	38	8	6
Germany	62	19	5	4
Greece	36	17	5	2
Spain	49	11	5	3
Finland	68	36	5	3
France	61	30	3	4
Ireland	47	20	15	5
Italy	46	8	2	0
Luxembourg	57	21	14	3
Netherlands	59	23	5	3
Austria	56	10	4	1
Portugal	44	9	5	2
Sweden	70	44	8	5
United Kingdom	55	25	7	6
Cyprus	53	19	9	3
Czech Republic	44	9	2	0
Estonia	54	25	1	2
Hungary	51	11	1	1
Latvia	48	24	2	3
Lithuania	62	8	1	1
Malta	30	7	3	3
Poland	43	8	1	0
Slovakia	36	6	2	0
Slovenia	40	10	2	2
<b>Total</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>3</b>

Broadly speaking, mobility – whether short or long distance – is relatively high in the Nordic countries. By contrast, in most of the NMS and southern European countries (with the exception of Malta), mobility within or outside the region is relatively low. As already observed, there are

marked country differences. The two countries with the greatest intra-EU past mobility are Ireland and Luxembourg (followed by Cyprus). The figure for Luxembourg reflects its highly international labour market and its global economic situation: in 2001, 61% of total employment was by non-nationals (OECD, 2004), while the share of foreign-born workers amounted to almost 39% in 2003 (Salt, 2006). In the case of Ireland, both the large number of foreign workers and the high level of return migration in the 1990s explain the high percentage of past mobility moves. This is reflected by the fact that of the survey respondents, the proportion of foreign-born workers in Luxembourg is 75%, while it is only 23% in Ireland. The UK, Denmark and Ireland also show a relatively high level of mobility outside the EU.

Overall, there is a tendency for countries with higher-than-average percentages of people who have moved across Europe to also show a higher percentage of their citizens having moved outside the EU. More generally, correlation analysis of the mobility indicators discussed in this chapter (age leaving the parental home, number of moves, duration of stay, past short-distance mobility and past long-distance mobility) shows they are all strongly and positively correlated. Countries whose citizens leave home early display more past moves and also have a larger proportion of people who report having made short- as well as long-distance moves.

### **Long-distance mobility: Motivation and effects**

The final issue in reconstructing Europeans' past mobility is to explore the main reasons that people give for having moved. In view of the conceptual model developed (*see Figure 1*), it is of particular interest to determine whether these motives include life-course considerations (directly or indirectly). Moreover, in order to better understand the reasons for long-distance mobility, we compare them with the reasons for short-distance moves.

#### **Motivation for long-distance moves**

In their model of migration, Harris and Todaro (1970) consider that people are responsive to differences in actual wage, i.e. the decision to move is based on the expected wage income from employment, net of migration costs. However, actual differences in wage are not likely to be the main reason for mobility. When deciding whether or not to move, people are likely to be interested not only in the wage they can get upon arrival, but also in their future employment and wage prospects (Sjaastad, 1962). Non-wage income (e.g. social security benefits) is also expected to play a role in the migration decision (Borjas, 1999).


The literature also suggests that income is not the only (and maybe not even the main) motivation for inter-regional mobility. Other non-financial aspects of mobility motives are demographics, family and social networks (Massey *et al*, 1998), and the housing market (Cameron and Muellbauer, 1998). Housing and social capital in particular seem to be of importance. As mortgage payments or rent constitute the largest part of a household's budget, housing market conditions and housing policies are likely to influence the decision on changing residence or taking up a new job (OECD, 2005). Tradition and culture of a country in terms of housing costs play a role in this context.

According to social capital theory, individual decision-making is embedded in social contexts, such as families, kin and ethnic communities (Massey *et al*, 1994). Social capital can be seen as a source

of family support (Portes, 1998). Therefore, family-related reasons are assumed to greatly influence migration decisions. One may assume that an individual's action, which at first glance does not appear to be rational, can follow a subjectively rational strategy within a household or a social network. Hence, family ties or available social capital can lead to bounded rationality or, as we suggest, 'bounded mobility' (see Chapter 4). Many studies show that migration decisions are holistic: economic, social and cultural factors all carry weight.

These motives for mobility are presented in Figure 6 and relate to the last short-distance and/or long-distance move that respondents made.<sup>8</sup> The three most important motives for short-distance moves (i.e. within town/city/region) are better housing (28%), a change of partnership or marital situation (23%) and the desire to own a home rather than rent (19%). Long-distance moves (i.e. outside region, within EU), however, are more often related to the labour market (new job or job transfer, 34%); a change of partnership or marital situation is also a key motive for moving (18%).<sup>9</sup> The major reasons for having made short-distance moves in the past are similar for males and females. However, gender differences are more apparent for long-distance moves: men report 'new job or job transfer' as the main reason for mobility far more often than do women (44% compared to 27%), while women more often seem to make a long-distance move in order to follow their partner. The latter finding is in line with the existing literature, which suggests that this decision is gender-biased (Jürges, 2005).

Figure 6 Reasons for short- and long-distance mobility (%)



Generally, the most important motives for mobility are more or less the same across birth cohorts. Thus, there is evidence that supports the idea that – besides the possibility for improvement of working (job) and living (housing) conditions – geographical mobility is related to life-course changes and, more specifically, to a change of partnership or marital situation.


<sup>8</sup> Unfortunately, the Eurobarometer survey data do not tell us what was the single most important mobility motive because respondents could report several answers simultaneously. However, despite this, 66%–70% indicated just one main motive; only between 11%–13% of respondents reported a possible maximum of three motives.

<sup>9</sup> See Krieger (2004), who also points to the importance of employment and income motives for mobility, using previous modules of the Eurobarometer mobility survey.

**Effects of long-distance moves**

The effects of long-distance mobility are shown in Figure 7. What aspects of life got better or worse for respondents after they moved outside their region or to another EU country? The general conclusion is that such a move was felt to be for the better: 45% reported that nothing got worse, while the main positive effect has been an improvement in housing conditions (36%). The second most frequently reported improvements refer to the job situation of one of the household members (25%) and, related to that, the household income (22%). If anything got worse after the last move, it was contact with friends and family (17%), which is, of course, likely to happen when people migrate out of their region or country of origin. But, on the other hand, many people also reported that social contacts improved after the move (probably the case for people returning to their region or country of origin). On balance, however, the net result is the dominance of positive effects of long-distance mobility.<sup>10</sup>

**Figure 7 Perceived effects of long-distance move (%)**



**Europeans’ intentions regarding future mobility**

Having examined Europeans’ geographical mobility in the past and its determinants, it is important, from a policy point of view, to explore their future intentions about moving. What is the potential for geographical mobility of the European workforce and what is the position of the NMS in this respect? There has been some migration to date from the NMS to the EU15. Will there be a massive flow in the future? Will Europe face an unforeseen mobility crisis or does the described phenomenon of bounded mobility imply that migration moves will be selective and follow already more or less established mobility patterns? Although we know that a stated intention to move has predictive value for future behaviour only under certain circumstances (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975; Manski, 1990), an attempt is made here to provide some answers to these questions in the analyses below.


<sup>10</sup> The classic psychological phenomenon of dissonance reduction underlying long-distance mobility justifications (overemphasising positive effects and downplaying negative effects) cannot be assessed here.

### Attitudes to mobility vs personal intentions

A large proportion of Europeans think that moving across regions or countries in the EU is generally speaking desirable: for individuals 49% are in favour of it, while 12% think it a bad thing; for the labour market 50% are in favour, 21% thinking it a bad thing; and for European integration 62% think it beneficial, while 11% do not think it is beneficial. These opinions are analysed further in Chapter 4. Europeans are, however, more negative when it comes to the effect of mobility on families: only 34% think that geographical mobility is a good thing for families, while 29% think it is a bad thing.

Despite this overall positive view of mobility, a large majority (almost 70%) have no personal intention to move in the near future, i.e. within the next five years (see Figure 8). In fact, the majority of respondents in all EU countries – including the NMS – do not expect to move abroad in the next five years, nor do they expect to move within their country. The respondents in the Czech Republic are most inclined to stay put; respondents in France and the UK indicate the strongest intentions to move. Women are less inclined to move than men. The largest demographic differences in intentions to move are found across age groups and educational levels: older people express less intention to move than younger people and the same applies to people with a lower level of educational attainment, compared to the better educated.

**Figure 8 Percentage of people who do not intend to move in the next five years, by country**



Regarding the EU view on the need for higher mobility of the EU workforce, it is important to note the greater expectations of moving among younger and better educated people. But it is equally important to note that having no intention to move does not necessarily reflect immobility or a lack of willingness to move. People are rooted in communities, have invested in their local social capital, are part of local networks, may have children at a crucial life-course stage and may have a working partner: all these factors, relating to bounded mobility, may make the advantages of moving and the necessary investments less clear. This will be especially true for long-distance and cross-border mobility. The reverse also applies: a stated intention to move does not, in itself, mean that people will actually move.

A more revealing picture is presented in Table 3, which shows the breakdown of Europeans' intentions to move in terms of destination. Almost 7% of the EU population expects to move to another region within the next five years and 3% expects to move within the EU. Looking at demographic correlates, findings indicate that intentions to migrate within the EU are greater among men; people under 35 years of age; the better educated and students; and unemployed people (who, on average, show somewhat higher intentions to move to all five destinations). Note that when respondents were asked, if they were unemployed, would they be ready to move to another region or country in order to find a job, only 30% said no; 5% did not know; 29% said they would be ready to move to another region only; and 5% to another country only. The rest (31%) would be ready to move to either another region or another country (*see also Chapter 4*).

From a life-course perspective, the relationship between household type and mobility intentions is interesting. It appears that single people (including single parents) are the most inclined to be mobile, followed by divorced or separated people. As might be expected, retired persons are the least inclined to make any moves in the next five years.

**Table 3 Mobility intentions, by demographic characteristics (%)**

	Within city/town or region	Across regions	Within EU	Outside EU
<b>Total</b>				
EU25	18	7	3	2
EU15	18	7	3	2
NMS	15	4	5	1
<b>Gender</b>				
Male	19	7	4	2
Female	17	6	3	1
<b>Age</b>				
18–24	37	19	9	5
25–34	29	9	6	3
35–44	18	6	2	2
45–54	11	5	2	1
55–64	9	4	1	1
65+	9	1	0	0
<b>Educational level</b>				
Low or none	10	2	1	1
Average	18	6	2	1
High	21	8	4	2
Still studying	34	24	12	6
<b>Employment status</b>				
Working	20	7	3	2
Unemployed	27	11	6	2
Retired	10	2	1	0
Homemaker	13	4	1	1
<b>Household type</b>				
Couple, no child*	14	5	2	1
Couple with children*	17	6	2	1
Single	30	13	7	4
Single parent	35	14	6	1
Divorced/separated	20	8	3	2
Widowed	9	2	1	0


*Note:* Figures indicate percentage of respondents who expressed an intention to move in the next five years.

\* Married or living together; child = person aged 0–14.

As Table 3 shows, expected intra-EU mobility in the NMS is greater than in the EU15. This, however, hides large variations *within* the NMS, four of which display high levels of mobility intentions – Latvia, Poland, Lithuania and Estonia (see Figure 9). The case of Poland is important in this respect: with a population of almost 40 million people, a percentage of about 7% that expects to move to another EU country in the next five years is quite substantial in absolute numbers. The other NMS have moderate or low levels of expected mobility.

That the potential for migration is large is confirmed by a recent Dutch study (Ecorys, 2006). This indicates that if the Netherlands were to open its borders to workers from the NMS, an estimated total of 53,000 to 63,000 workers would move to the country within a year (90% of them from Poland). Compared to the 30,000 work permits issued in 2005, this is a substantial increase.

**Figure 9 Percentage of people who expect to move to another EU country in the next five years, by country**



Whether these figures point to a likely exodus from the NMS (especially by Polish workers) to the EU15, only time will tell. But if those who expect they will move do so, who are they and what do they bring with them in terms of human capital?<sup>11</sup> Table 4 breaks down, by age and educational level, the percentage of people who expect to move to another EU country from those NMS with a low/moderate EU mobility intention (Czech Republic, Slovenia, Hungary, Slovakia, Cyprus and Malta) and from those NMS with a high EU mobility intention (Latvia, Poland, Lithuania and Estonia).

Among the potential migrants are many young people. In the ‘high EU mobility intention’ group, 75% are aged under 35 years. Coming from the ‘low EU mobility intention’ group, one can also expect people from older age groups (aged 55 or more). Another major difference relates to the educational level of people who expect to move. In the ‘high EU mobility intention’ group, about

<sup>11</sup> Note that expected mobility will be studied in greater detail in the second phase of this research project.

one-third of the people who expect to move to another EU country are still studying and another one-third are highly educated. (These proportions are lower in the ‘low EU mobility intention’ group.) This means that for these NMS, cross-border mobility could well lead to a ‘brain gain’ for the EU15, but a ‘brain drain’ for their own countries.

**Table 4 Percentage of people in NMS who expect to move to another EU country within the next five years, by age and educational level**

	<b>Countries with low/moderate EU mobility intentions (CZ, CY, HU, MT, SI, SK)</b>	<b>Countries with high EU mobility intentions (EE, LT, LV, PL)</b>
<b>Age</b>		
18–24	38	35
25–34	33	40
35–44	13	17
45–54	3	6
55–64	6	1
65+	7	0
Total	100	100
<b>Educational level</b>		
Low or none	6	3
Average	46	32
High	24	32
Still studying	24	34
Total	100	100

### Past and future mobility

Do people who have moved in the past also intend to make (more) moves in the near future? Figure 10 compares the intentions to move in the next five years for respondents who have, and who have not, moved in the past. The data show that people who moved in the past have a higher propensity to move in the near future. This is especially so for people who have made long-distance moves. This means that people who have prior experience of mobility are more likely to move again in the future.<sup>12</sup> This could imply that they are ready to move to another new place, but it could also reveal a wish to move back to their original region or country. It is not possible to make an accurate distinction between these motives with the data available. However, the conclusion seems to be that those who move tend to retain the tendency to move, particularly when long distances are involved.

### Factors affecting mobility expectations

The focus in the remaining part of this discussion is on cross-border mobility intentions and especially on factors that, in the eyes of Europeans, would encourage or discourage their future mobility (see Figures 11 and 12). Questions in the Eurobarometer survey relating to these attitudes were asked of all respondents, regardless of whether or not they intended to move in the next five years.

<sup>12</sup> This is confirmed by multivariate analysis. Ordered regressions have been run to model the distance of mobility taking the longest distance into account. After controlling for gender, age, educational level, employment status and household type, it turns out that those who moved longer distances in the past are more inclined to move further away in the future.

Figure 10 Intention to move in the next five years, by destination and past mobility (%)





Figure 11 Factors that would encourage people to move to another country, by intention to move in the next five years (%)




In the first instance, respondents were asked which factors would encourage them to move to another country. As Figure 11 shows, the greatest split between people with or without an intention to move is clearly the high proportion of those with no intention of moving who state that no factor whatsoever would encourage them to move. With respect to more intrinsic motivations, it is found that people who expect to move more frequently mention ‘pull’ factors such as discovering a new environment, better working conditions and higher household income. This last factor confirms the model of Mincer (1978), according to which people evaluate the total effect of migration on household income rather than the immediate wage gain (Harris and Todaro, 1970) or life-time income (Sjaastad, 1962). The opportunity to meet new people also ranks high as a factor favouring mobility. Overall, the reported factors are a mixture of material and non-material. It seems that people who intend to move attribute a greater value to various positive factors of moving abroad

than do people who do not expect to move. Further analyses indicate that men and younger people more often cite work-related or income-related motives.

Figure 12 shows the factors that would discourage respondents from moving to another country. Obviously, the differences here are less pronounced than was the case for the encouraging factors. Now the difference between both groups is more on losing family ties and on having to learn a new language (perceived language difficulties are more often reported by older people and the lower educated). The loss of primary social networks is a particularly discouraging factor for women.

**Figure 12 Factors that would discourage a move to another country, by intention to move in the next five years (%)**



In addition, respondents were asked what they thought would be the greatest difficulties they would have to face if they did want to move to another EU country. On average, 67% of the EU population expect language or culture-related difficulties, while almost 43% anticipate employment-related problems. Some 13% mention possible difficulties about transferability of pension rights (Boeri *et al*, 2002); 15% fear not being able to find suitable housing; and 14% expect poorer access to public facilities (such as access to healthcare or social benefits). Furthermore, findings indicate that language and cultural problems are particularly expected by people from Greece, Ireland, the Czech Republic, Latvia and Lithuania, whereas work-related difficulties are mentioned by people from Slovakia, Austria, Cyprus, Slovenia and Greece. The transferability of pension rights is seen as a problem, in particular, by citizens in Austria, Luxembourg, Belgium, the Netherlands, Finland and Germany, while citizens in Belgium, Finland and Sweden are particularly concerned about loss of access to public facilities.

### Changing mobility intentions

Using previous modules of the Eurobarometer mobility survey, it is possible to compare mobility intentions over time. Mobility intentions were recorded in 2001 for the EU15 countries (EB 54.2) and in 2002 for the then candidate countries (EB CC 2002.1). In 2001–2002, only 20% reported an intention to move within the next five years. We have already seen that in 2005 the majority (69%)

of the European population (aged 18 or more) had no intentions of moving, while 31% expected to move within the next five years (see Figure 8). There also seems to have been an increase between 2001–2002 and 2005 of those people who intend to move *within* the EU – in the EU15, from 1.7% to 2.7%, and in the NMS from 1.6% to 5.1%. This increase in mobility intentions should, however, be treated with caution since the design of the question over the years has not been exactly the same.<sup>13</sup>

Because these figures are likely affected by the changes in the wording of the question, a more robust way of comparing the data is to look at the ‘difference in differences’, i.e. to compare the relative change in levels rather than the levels themselves (see Table 5). The increase in intentions to move (both short and long distances) has been relatively larger in the EU15 than in the NMS. However, intentions to move *within* the EU have increased relatively more for people in the NMS. This is especially true for those NMS with a high EU mobility intention – Latvia, Poland, Lithuania and Estonia (see Table 4). This outcome tends to show that migration flows in the future are indeed likely to increase compared to past levels (Krieger and Fernandez Macías, 2006). This, probably, is a direct consequence of EU enlargement.

**Table 5 Percentage of people who expect to move, difference-in-differences, 2001 and 2005**

	Expect to move			Expect to move within EU		
	2001	2005	Difference	2001	2005	Difference
EU15	20.6	32.1	11.5	1.7	2.7	1.0
NMS	16.4	26.6	10.2	1.6	5.1	3.5
Difference-in-differences			-1.3			2.4

## Findings and conclusions on geographical mobility

Conceptually and analytically, this chapter has approached the issue of geographical mobility in Europe from a comprehensive life-course perspective. From this perspective, the first major event for most people is leaving the parental home. This occurs, on average, at 22 years of age, with a large degree of diversity among the countries of Europe: early home-leavers are found in Nordic countries and late home-leavers in southern Europe (Spain and Italy) and Malta. Mobility very much depends on the age of the individual. For this reason, the average duration of residence in each dwelling was computed, while accounting for differences in age and age when one left the parental home. The results indicate that Europeans, on average, stay about 10 years in each dwelling: this number incorporates relatively short stays by young adults and relatively long stays later in life. The average duration of stay is longer in the NMS, but considerably shorter in the Scandinavian countries and in the Netherlands, UK and France.

Although many respondents moved house several times in their life, most of these moves were confined to their near neighbourhood (32% within their town) or within the region of origin (24%). Only a minority of Europeans have moved over long distances: 18% of the EU population has moved outside their region of origin, while only 4% has moved to another EU country. The mobility

<sup>13</sup> The 2001 question for the EU15, and the 2002 question for the then candidate countries, first asked respondents if they intended to move, and then asked them where they intended to move to. The 2005 question, by contrast, asked ‘Do you think that in the next five years you are likely to move to ...?’. Apart from differences in formulation, in the 2005 question the option to state an intention not to move comes last in the list.

rate to and from countries outside the EU is even lower (3%). The level of past mobility within the EU is lower than average in all the NMS, with the exception of Cyprus.

More than a third of those who made a long-distance move did so for labour market reasons: a new job or job transfer. The second most reported reason is a change of marital status (18%). Many report an improvement of their employment or income position after the last long-distance move, but many also report an improvement of their housing situation.

Can we expect more geographical mobility in Europe in the future? This question cannot, at this point, be answered with accuracy given the available data, but it is possible to shed some light on people's intentions about moving in the near future. The findings show that although many Europeans have a rather positive view about mobility as such, the majority (70%) are quite happy with where they live at present and do not expect to move within the next five years. Those who do expect to move are only likely to move short distances from where they currently live. Only 7% of Europeans expect to move across a region, while just 3% intend to move to another EU country.

When comparing the mobility intentions of 2005 with those of 2001, it can be concluded that the mobility intentions of citizens in the NMS are rising, compared to those of citizens in the EU15. It is hazardous to take these figures at face value in order to derive precise quantitative predictions on the mobility stream for the near future, but we can certainly be more specific on perceived barriers to, and incentives for, mobility. According to the respondents, the major incentives for mobility within the EU are related to employment and income. Many Europeans also report that they would be ready to move in order to discover new environments. Thus, people refer to a mixture of material and non-material motivations as reasons for a possible move to another country.

The most important barrier to cross-country mobility is the loss of social contacts. For mobility within the EU, people perceive language and cultural differences as major impediments to mobility. In short, social and cultural factors, in particular, hinder intra-EU mobility.

Three major substantive conclusions can be drawn on the basis of these analyses and findings:

- **At present, cross-border mobility in Europe is not very high.** According to the 2005 Eurobarometer survey data, no dramatic increase is expected in the near future, and not for all EU25 countries. This can be most likely explained by the fact that moving across borders involves the loss of social networks in the country of origin. It also involves the search for new employment opportunities and the learning of new language skills. Moving across EU borders is not only hampered by a variety of institutional and legal hurdles between Member States, but also by the fact that the decision to move is affected by cultural barriers and by the social costs of leaving one's family, friends, colleagues and local community. It is also strongly influenced by the individual's personal life-course stage (e.g. the presence of young children, having a working partner or job career phase). The decision not to move, therefore, is not, a priori, a sign of a lack of willingness to move; rather it is constricted by institutions, culture, networks and individual life-course trajectories and assessments. Moreover, an extremely mobile Europe would evoke serious negative social effects: the severe loss of cohesion and community. An extremely mobile European workforce would also result in severe management problems within European firms. Therefore, the scope and level of geographical mobility is always a matter of finding the optimum level.

- **The various mobility indicators differ within and between EU Member States**, particularly between the EU15 and the NMS; substantial variations also exist within the NMS themselves. (These indicators include mobility out of the parental home, mobility within or outside the country border and future intended mobility.) In this sense, an 'old–new divide' in the mobility statistics is too simplistic a representation of the great diversity of mobility patterns in Europe. This diversity tempers the idea of a massive exodus from the NMS to the EU15.
- **The actual number of people within the NMS who intend to move to another EU country may, in absolute terms, be quite significant**, despite the fact that the *percentage* of such people is rather modest. This is clearly reflected in the case of Poland: about 7% of that country's population expect to move to another EU country in the next five years. With a population of some 40 million people, this would imply a considerable number of migrants.

# Job mobility in the career of European workers

# 3

## Transitional labour markets

Among the theories on labour market and career mobility, the concept of the 'transitional labour market' is probably the most influential in contemporary Europe. This theory, developed by Schmid (2000), suggests that traditional policies put too much emphasis on economic growth and raising the numbers of people in work. Instead, Schmid proposes a strategy of qualitative growth, which would provide some bridging arrangements to facilitate transitions between periods of work, unemployment, education and non-activity. The concept is based on the premise that the ideal of 'full employment' in the traditional sense (eight hours per day, five days per week) can no longer be maintained due to a process of individualisation. Full employment can still be aimed for, but should be measured by a different standard, e.g. a 30-hour week (Muffels, 2001).

This theory has been attractive for policy-oriented research because of the fact that it has both an analytical and a normative nature. Built partly on a life-course perspective, which distinguishes different transitions related to age and duration, the analytical component of the theory tries to understand the changing dynamics of the labour market by analysing the interaction of flows between and among transitions in a person's life. The normative component is mostly policy-oriented and tries to evaluate whether the institutional arrangements that have been designed are able to prevent negative events (e.g. job loss) from becoming negative downward spirals (e.g. a long period of unemployment) (Reçi and de Bruijn, 2004).

As the theory suggests, different mobility levels will exist where different institutional arrangements are observed. Basically, Schmid suggests that transitional labour markets can be seen as 'risk management institutions'. They extend conventional social policy by encouraging people to risk transitions between different employment relationships or to combine such relationships. If transitions, as well as work, can 'pay', labour markets will become more flexible, economic growth more employment-intensive and all major income risks related to transitions – and not just unemployment – will be covered. In this way, transitional labour markets could make a significant contribution to full employment, alongside more conventional labour market and employment policies (Schmid and Schömann, 2003).

Job mobility should be most prominent in those countries that provide the best 'institutional arrangements'. Different countries perform differently in relation to labour market flexibility and work security. Divergent patterns of job mobility can thus be expected for different countries.

If European transitional labour markets are functioning in the way the theory suggests, we would expect that job mobility levels are equally distributed among the employed population. If risk management institutions guarantee the smooth adaptation of labour supply and demand, and reduce mobility costs to a negligible level, there would be little difference between employees in the way they look for new opportunities with new employers and develop new competencies. Job mobility rates and levels would be equally distributed according to age, educational level or household structure. In a transitional labour market, so the theory goes, mobility levels are high and spread equally. Mobility is considered as a positive phenomenon for all.

The realisation of this kind of labour market is, however, far from achieved. Since employees are convinced that this kind of risk management does not exist, and consequently believe that

transitions do not pay, they will try to keep their current labour market position if no alternative job is available. Some people, however, will not be able to stay in their current labour market position and will be forced to take the risk of being mobile. The fact that not all people have equal chances in this risky environment will result in a dual or segmented labour market (Doeringer and Piore, 1971; Van Hoof, 1987).

In the first sector of this dual labour market, workers are regarded as an asset to the firm, working conditions are favourable, job security is high and internal promotion is possible. Jobs in the second sector, on the other hand, are characterised by poor pay and working conditions, poor job security and few career prospects. This creates a vicious circle in which workers in the second sector are stuck; their job mobility is high and they tend to move between precarious jobs. Thus, the hypothesis is that job mobility rates and levels will be lower among the 'strong' groups on the labour market. Higher job mobility is to be expected among the 'weaker' groups, such as women, non-natives, less educated individuals, lone parents and blue-collar workers.

The assumed imperfect transitional labour market also has consequences on the age distribution of job mobility. As people tend to hold on to a comfortable labour market position, higher mobility rates are to be expected at the start of careers, i.e. in younger age groups. In a precarious labour market, mobility is high but unequally spread, and has a negative impact for many.

Job mobility comprises all transitions between different divisions of the labour market and between different socio-economic positions in the labour market. Because of the specificity of the data in the Eurobarometer survey, this section will focus on job mobility, i.e. career changes within paid employment. Internal mobility (changing jobs within the same organisation) will be covered briefly as an alternative to external job mobility. The following discussion will analyse, from a life-course perspective, the start of the job mobility career (the decision to enter labour market), levels of job mobility (which are related to the number of jobs in the career and their average duration), differences in levels of job mobility and motivations, and intentions of future job mobility.


### **Start of job mobility career**

From a life-course perspective on job mobility, the first important event is a person's first job. Entry to the labour market occurs, on average, at 19 years for Europeans. There are, however, some differences between EU Member States, both with regard to the median age and the dispersion around this median. In Figure 13, the boxes represent the range between the top and bottom quartile, and the median age (18 years for the EU25) is represented by a thick line inside the box. There is an early transition from school to work in southern European countries (Spain, Portugal and Malta) and in the UK. Denmark, Italy and the Netherlands are at the other end of the spectrum. In the NMS, the dispersion around the average age is smaller than in the EU15, which indicates that all respondents in these countries started working at more or less the same age – in contrast to Italy, Denmark or Greece, for example. Overall, the differences between the EU Member States are quite small. Certainly, the differences are more pronounced for the start of the geographical mobility career, i.e. leaving the parental home (*see Figure 2*).

Older cohorts entered the labour market at an earlier age than did the younger cohorts, as seen in Figure 13 (*right-hand side*). Respondents who were born between 1900 and 1930 were on average aged 18.3 years when they entered the labour market; on average, the youngest cohorts started

their first job when they were between 1.1 and 1.5 years older. The median age of entering the labour market has risen from 16 years for the oldest cohort to 19 years for the youngest cohort. The postponed labour market entrance of the younger cohorts can be attributed to their higher educational attainment. In general, the educational level of younger generations in Europe is at least equal to the educational attainment of their parents (Iannelli, 2003). There is no significant difference between the average labour market entry ages of male and female respondents. Looking at the influence of the degree of urbanisation of the area in which respondents live, we find that people living in rural areas are on average 1.2 years younger when starting their first job than people living in large towns.

**Figure 13 Median age for starting first job, by country and cohort**



**Respondents who have never worked**


The percentage of people who have never entered the labour market falls with age. This is not surprising: the older people become, the less chance there is that they have never had a job. However, even at age 35 and over – an age at which, it may be assumed, the respondent would already have entered the labour market if he or she had wished to do so – there is still a significant percentage (8%) of people who have never worked (see Figure 14).

The percentage who have never worked differs greatly for men and women: while only 1% of all men older than 35 have never worked, this figure grows to 13% for women. Compared to men, women more often take up household tasks and as a consequence perform less paid labour. Educational attainment is also a significant influence: a high level of education goes hand in hand with a lower likelihood of never having worked. When household structure is analysed, a higher proportion of people without children (aged 14 or younger) living in their household have never worked, compared to households with children.


As expected, there are important differences between EU Member States (see Figure 15). Southern European countries show the highest proportions of respondents who have never worked: in Italy, 21% of people aged 35 and over have never worked; the other Mediterranean countries have

proportions around 15%. It should also be noted that, almost exclusively, women constitute the majority of those who have never worked in these countries. For example, 36% of Italian women have never worked, compared to only 2% of Italian men. This gender division is less stark in those Member States with low overall percentages of respondents who have never worked: this is particularly true for Germany, where the proportion of men who have never worked almost equals that of women. High participation rates of women in post-socialist Member States account for the low overall percentages of people who have never worked in these countries.

**Figure 14 Percentage of people aged 35 and over who have never worked, by demographic characteristics**



**Figure 15 Percentage of people aged 35 and over who have never worked, by country and sex**




In Scandinavian countries (and to a lesser extent in other European countries), a redefinition of gender relationships on the labour market, the family and welfare state policy has eroded the

model of the male breadwinner. This model persists in southern Europe, with limited growth of part-time jobs, less participation of men in family tasks and a sparse development of policies for reconciling family and work duties. In southern Europe, the family has remained as a central institution of socialisation and as a network of micro-solidarity. Social protection in the Mediterranean welfare regime continues to rely heavily on the role of the family as producer and distributor of welfare. The involvement of women in unpaid care, mainly for both older people and children, has been crucial for social cohesion (Moreno, 2002). As a consequence, women are more likely never to enter the labour market.

## Levels of job mobility

Job mobility in the later career stages of Europeans can be assessed by looking at the number of times respondents have changed employer and their average job duration (in order to correct for length of labour market career). The Eurobarometer survey data show that the average number of jobs that respondents have held is 3.9 (see Figure 16).


**Figure 16** Percentage of people, by career



### People who have never changed employer


As seen in Figure 16, many respondents have had only one employer in their career. By looking at the profile of these respondents, it is obvious that younger respondents with a relatively short labour market career have not had as many opportunities to change employer as older respondents. The percentage of respondents who have never changed employer decreases with age, until about 35 years (see Figure 17). At that age, the proportion more or less stabilises, then increases again for older respondents. In order to avoid including young people for whom not changing employer does not necessarily indicate a lack of mobility, ‘never mobile’ people are defined here as those who have never changed employer and are aged 35 or older. With this definition, we find that 25% of respondents in the Eurobarometer mobility survey have never changed employer in their career.

**Figure 17** Percentage of people who have never changed employer, by age



As seen in Figure 18, there are substantial differences between the countries of the EU25 in the percentage of people who have never changed employer.

**Figure 18** Percentage of people who have never changed employer, by country



Within the EU15, there is a striking correlation between mobility levels and the country classification of welfare states introduced by Esping-Andersen (1990) to compare the institutional arrangements between the EU15 countries.<sup>14</sup> Briefly, he distinguishes three types of welfare states in Europe:

<sup>14</sup> This classification is only specified for the EU15 countries and not for the 10 NMS. However, on the basis of the different job mobility indicators treated here, an attempt will be made to classify the NMS with regard to their job mobility profile at the end of this chapter. In Chapter 4 of this report, a country-clustering based on both geographical and job mobility is given for all 25 EU Member States.

- liberal regimes (UK and, to a lesser extent, Ireland), where collective benefit systems are very limited and people are encouraged to provide for their own private insurance programmes;
- social-democratic regimes (Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands), where very generous and universal social insurance programmes exist;
- corporatist regimes (Germany, France, Belgium, Austria and Luxembourg), where more or less generous benefit systems exist, but emphasis is put on these benefits being primarily funded by contributions over recipients' own working lives.

In a later stage, a fourth type of welfare state, the southern regimes, has been added, although countries in this category do not always display a uniform character. (See also Goodin *et al*, 1999.)

It has been argued before that these welfare state regimes differ in the degree to which labour market transitions occur and in the outcome of transitions in terms of work and income security (Muffels *et al*, 2002). These two factors are labelled respectively 'flexibility' and 'security', and countries that attain the highest level of 'flexicurity' are expected to have the highest rates of job mobility. This is the case for the social-democratic regimes, where the levels of both labour market flexibility and security are high – in the case of market flexibility, because of the fairly low levels of employment protection and in the case of security, because of active labour market policies, low exit rates and high re-entry rates. Liberal regimes also have high labour market flexibility and therefore high levels of job mobility are anticipated for these countries. Corporatist and southern regimes score much lower on flexibility, with the former showing higher work security than the latter; lower job mobility is expected in these two types of regime (Muffels and Luijkx, 2004). Thus, in terms of mobility, social-democratic and liberal regimes are expected to show higher levels of mobility than corporatist and southern regimes.

Regarding the influence of institutional arrangements on the levels of job mobility, it has been suggested that liberal regimes will have somewhat higher levels of labour market mobility than social-democratic regimes. The corporatist and southern regimes perform worse in terms of enhancing job mobility (Muffels *et al*, 2002; Muffels and Luijkx, 2004).

These hypotheses are confirmed in the empirical data seen in Figure 18. In the EU15, the lowest proportions of respondents who have never changed employer are found in the UK and in the social-democratic countries of Denmark, Sweden, Finland and the Netherlands. In the NMS, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania also have low proportions. Southern countries, such as Malta, Greece, Portugal and Italy, have much higher proportions of respondents who have never changed employer.

### **A job for life?**

As an aside, it is interesting to see if people think that a 'job for life' still exists. The analysis above would suggest that the answer to this is 'Yes': 25% of all Europeans older than 35 have never changed employer. These people could then be considered as having a job for life (or at least being well on their way). But will the 'job for life' continue to exist in the future? Will job mobility rates remain the same or will they increase drastically in the future?

It is often claimed that the process of globalisation entails more flexible labour markets. Due to changing economic environments, frequent adjustments are inevitable. Labour market and job


mobility would appear to be on the rise as a consequence and long-term employment relationships are said to be increasingly replaced by a more heterogeneous and volatile service sector economy (Auer, 2005). How is this reflected in the data presented here?

We find that the percentage of people who have never changed employer increases with age. The largest proportion of people who have never changed employer is in the older cohorts and is higher within the population that is currently not working (26%) than in the population still active on the labour market (21%). Younger cohorts have a greater opportunity of having worked for at least two employers and are thus more mobile than older cohorts. But we cannot predict whether people in younger cohorts will remain mobile throughout their careers or whether they will settle in a satisfactory job during the later stages of their working life. In the former case, overall job mobility will rise; in the latter case, job mobility would be expected to remain at the current level.

When asked whether they think that changing employer every few years is good for people, 42% of respondents agreed, or agreed completely (see Figure 19). The youngest group of respondents, aged 15-24, more often agreed (47%) than older respondents. The overall attitude to job mobility then is more positive among younger respondents, although it should be noted that more than half of them did not think that job mobility is a good thing.

When asked to what extent they agreed with the statement 'Nowadays, there is no such thing as a job for life', 80% of all respondents agreed or tended to agree (see Figure 19). Young people agreed less than older people (70% in the age group 15–24 years), which suggests that young people believe more in the existence of a 'job for life' than older respondents. It is not known, however, whether these young people envisage a job for life for themselves or whether they perceive a job for life as something older people are likely to have.

**Figure 19 Attitudes towards a 'job for life' and job mobility, by age (%)**



The analysis so far has provided two indications pointing in different directions as to whether future job mobility levels will increase or not. On the one hand, young people are more inclined to

think that job mobility is good for people: on that basis, one would expect younger cohorts to be more mobile, probably even in the later stages of their career. On the other hand, this same young group holds the strongest belief in a 'job for life', leading to the expectation that young people, too, might settle in the later stages of their career (as we observe among older respondents who currently are in those later stages of their career). The answer to the question is probably situated between these two extremes: job mobility will probably increase moderately, but there is no reason to believe that younger cohorts will remain as occupationally mobile in the later stages of their careers as they are today.

Comparison of the level of job mobility in the 2005 Eurobarometer mobility survey (EB 64.1) with the data obtained in 2001 for the EU15 (EB 54.2) would appear to confirm this statement. In the EU15, job mobility increased from 29.1% in 2001 to 32.1% in 2005. Other studies have also indicated that no dramatic change has taken place over the last few years. For example, Auer (2005) finds that the average length of job tenure hardly changed over the 1990s.

### Average job duration

The next step in this analysis is to look at the whole population of respondents in the survey and to describe their job mobility during their entire labour market career. Because of the fact that older people have had more opportunities to change employer than younger people, an indicator has been used to correct for length of career. The average job duration is calculated by dividing the length of the labour market career by the number of jobs of the individual (i):<sup>15</sup>


$$\text{Average job duration}_i = (\text{age}_i - \text{age first job}_i) / \text{number of jobs}_i$$

In Europe, the average job duration is calculated to be 8.3 years. The lowest average job duration (and thus the highest mobility over the entire career) is found in those Member States earlier typified as having a low proportion of people who had never changed employer (see Figure 18), i.e. the Scandinavian countries of Denmark, Sweden and Finland, the Baltic countries of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, and the UK and the Netherlands (see Figure 20). Portugal is at the least mobile end of the scale (where the average job duration is 11 years), followed by Slovakia, Austria, Malta and Slovenia.

Figure 21 shows a breakdown of average job duration by gender, age, educational level and household structure. It can be seen that there are no significant differences in average job duration between men and women. It thus seems that women who do take part in the labour market have broadly similar mobility careers to their male counterparts. The data also clearly show that the average job duration increases steeply with age. This confirms the idea that job mobility is higher in the early stages of people's careers. Those in the youngest age category (24 years or younger) have an average job duration of 1.7 years. This is partly due to the fact that they have, on average, not yet been in the labour market during the 10 years indicated in this category; the high average number of jobs (2.8 on average), however, also explains this short average job duration.


<sup>15</sup> Note that this is an upper limit of the average job duration rather than the average job duration itself. Due to the fact that little information is available on the periods in which respondents did not work, it is not possible to determine the actual average job duration based on the data of the Eurobarometer survey. To put this average job duration in perspective, we compare it to the current job duration, which has an average of 10 years. This indicates that the average job duration, as defined here, is a reasonable approximation of the actual average job duration.

**Figure 20 Average job duration, by country (years)**



Longer job durations, and thus less job mobility, is found among older respondents. It seems that workers tend to keep their labour market position in the later stages of their career, either because they have found a job that satisfies them or because they perceive their chances of finding another job to be small (for example, because of employers' preferences for younger candidates). It is noteworthy that the average number of jobs does not increase for people aged 35 and above. This indicates that, in the past, people stayed longer with the same employer than they do now. The age divide in job mobility behaviour clearly indicates that the development of 'risk management institutions' that enhance labour market mobility is far from realised.

**Figure 21 Average job duration in years, by demographic characteristics**



The influence of level of education on the average job duration is again a result of the predominance of elderly people in the category of lesser educated respondents. If we correct for

length of career, we find that higher educated respondents have a slightly higher average job duration.

Respondents with children living in the household show shorter average job durations, and thus higher job mobility, than do their counterparts without children. The difference between the average job duration of people with or without children is 1.8 years for single respondents; the difference for respondents living with a partner is 2.7 years. This difference is in line with the age effect described above. People with children up to 14 years of age living in the household will typically be part of the most mobile age groups. People with children will probably have more pressing financial needs and will therefore search more actively for better paid jobs. A special group are lone parents, who show the lowest average job duration of all four categories. Lone parents have, by definition, only one income: financial needs, and the search for better paid jobs, are therefore likely to be more pronounced in this group (Cantillon *et al*, 2004). For single parents, who cannot share the caring duties, it is even more important to find an optimal combination between their working life and their family responsibilities. The higher job mobility of lone parents can be explained in this way.

Turning to the job characteristics of mobile respondents, there is an apparent segmentation in the labour market, with the most vulnerable groups having to change jobs most frequently (see Figure 22). Looking first at the activity sector of the organisation in which the respondent is employed,<sup>16</sup> different sectors have very different levels of job mobility. Long average job durations are found in the agricultural sector (13.3 years) and in the public services sector, with the least mobility to be found in public administration and defence (11.7 years). Sectors with short average job durations, and thus high levels of mobility, include the construction and services sectors. Within the services sector, the shortest average job duration can be found in the hotels and restaurants sector (6.3 years). The difference between job mobility levels in the 'stable' public sector and the 'volatile' services sector are to be expected: the more a sector is protected or less affected by shocks on the labour market, the less likely are people to involuntarily change employer (Muffels and Luijckx, 2004). Overall job mobility will therefore be lower in these more shielded sectors.

Looking at the current position in the labour market, self-employed respondents (with an average job duration of 9.8 years) are found to have a more stable labour market position than their employed counterparts (8 years). Within the group of employed respondents, managers have longer average job durations than other employees. This means that people with a higher position and more responsibilities are less mobile than their colleagues with fewer responsibilities. The widespread idea that 'strong' groups (as opposed to 'weaker' groups lower in an organisation's hierarchy) are more mobile is therefore again not supported by the survey data. The opposite appears to be the case, which again points to the existence of a dual labour market.


There is a substantial difference between the average job durations of respondents with permanent contracts and those with non-permanent contracts (the latter includes fixed term contracts, temporary employment agency contracts and apprenticeship and other traineeship contracts).

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<sup>16</sup> Mining, manufacturing and electricity, gas and water supply have been regrouped as 'industries'. Trade, hotels and restaurants, transport, storage and communication, financial services, and real estate, renting and business activities are regrouped as 'services'. 'Public services' include public administration and defence, education, health and social work, and other community, social and personal service activities.

Figure 22 shows that people with permanent contracts stay on average 8.8 years with the same employer, while those without a permanent contract stay on average only four years.

**Figure 22 Average job duration, by sector, occupation, contract type and number of previous unemployment spells (years)**



Spells of unemployment seem to have a significant influence on job mobility. The average job duration decreases sharply once the respondent has been unemployed for more than three months for one or more occasions in their career. People who have never been unemployed report, on average, a job duration of 9.6 years. In contrast, people who have been unemployed have an average job duration of five years; this falls to four years or fewer for people who have had more than one spell of unemployment in their career.

These results lead to the conclusion that the realisation of risk management institutions that would make job mobility a risk-free choice has, to date, not been achieved. There is ample evidence of the existence of a segmented labour market: people who find themselves in a weak position are stuck in the second sector of the labour market. They have to change jobs more often and are more likely to change to a new job that is not necessarily better than the previous one – at least, not in terms of job security. This is particularly the case for low-skilled manual workers, people with non-permanent employment contracts and people who have had at least one spell of unemployment in their career.

### Recent job mobility


So far, this discussion has centred on entry to the labour market and job mobility over the course of careers. The following section looks at the most recent change of employer and the timing of this latest change.

One out of four working respondents still work for their first employer (*see Figure 16*). This means that 75% of the currently working respondents have changed employer at least once in their career.

About 50% of the currently working respondents have changed employer at least once over the course of the last 10 years; 32% of them joined their current employer in the last five years. Out of the entire working population, 8% changed employer as recently as during the last year (2005, when the survey was conducted).

The results on recent job mobility levels are in line with the previous findings on job mobility over the entire labour market career (see Figure 20). Figure 23 shows that Denmark is the EU15 country with the highest recent job mobility rates (almost 16% of the Danish workforce joined their current employer as recently as within the last year). The UK and Ireland display the next highest rates of recent job mobility among the EU15. In the NMS, high recent job mobility rates are found in the Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania), with Hungary having the most occupationally mobile population of the NMS. Most southern European countries (e.g. Greece, Malta and Portugal) and Austria typically show lower levels of job mobility, most people having joined their current employer some time ago. Spain and Cyprus do not follow this pattern and have moderate mobility rates.

**Figure 23 Job mobility, by country (%)**



A breakdown of recent job mobility levels by gender, age, educational level and household structure shows more or less the same picture as the results found for the average job duration (see Figure 21).

Table 6 provides a summary of the levels of job mobility of all respondents dealt with so far.

### Internal mobility of non-mobile workers

As an interesting aside, job mobility within the labour market can also be internal, i.e. workers can move jobs or positions within the same organisation, rather than between employers. As we have seen, 25% of those respondents who are currently working have never changed employer. In order to estimate whether these respondents have been internally mobile (i.e. whether they occupy a different position with the same employer), a comparison is made of the skills they needed when they started working with their employer with the skills they need at present (see Figure 24).


**Table 6 Job mobility profile of all respondents**

CURRENTLY NOT WORKING: 53%					
Never worked: 18% (within the population aged 35 and over: 8%: 13% women; 1% men)			Ever worked: 82% (within the population aged 35 and over: 92%)		
CURRENTLY WORKING: 47%					
Changed employer during the last ... (cumulative): 75%				Never changed employer: 25%	
1 year	5 years	10 years	Ever	Internally mobile	Not internally mobile
8%	32%	50%	75%	12.5%	12.5%

Assuming that more, fewer or different skills indicate a different job within the same organisation, it is found that half of the respondents who have never changed employer have been internally mobile.

The more mobile respondents are, the less likely they are to continue using the same skills they used when they started working with their current employer. Moreover, people who change employer acquire skills that are even more different and they are unlikely to be using the same skills as in their previous job. Job mobility (or a history of job mobility) is therefore good for the acquisition of different skills, both in the transition from one employer to another and within the same organisation.

**Figure 24 Skills needed in present job compared to skills needed in previous career stages (%)**



**Voluntary vs. forced job mobility**

Besides the timing of the most recent change of employer, it is also interesting to examine whether the last job transition occurred on a voluntary basis or on a forced basis. Forced and voluntary transitions are distinguished here by analysing why the respondent left their previous employer.

- Forced transitions distinguish between labour market-related transitions (e.g. redundancy or expired contract) and health-related transitions.
- Voluntary labour market-related reasons include not liking the previous job, finding a better job or creating one's own business.
- Voluntary household-related reasons relate to taking up caring duties for children, elderly or other dependant people, and looking after the home.
- Other voluntary career breaks include the pursuit of studies or training, the desire to stop working and leaving the previous employer as a consequence of moving away.

It should be noted that, to a certain extent, this regrouping is done arbitrarily; it is, for example, possible that in some cases taking up caring duties is a forced, rather than a voluntary transition.

Table 7 gives the percentages of the different types of forced and voluntary transitions for people who left their previous employer within the past five years.<sup>17</sup> Forced and voluntary labour market-related reasons have more or less equal proportions, but it can be seen that people who voluntarily left their previous employer were more likely to be working at the time of the survey than people who were forced to leave their previous employer. The following discussion focuses on respondents who are currently working. All categories of forced and voluntary reasons will be taken together; retired people and respondents who gave no reason (or gave 'Other' as a reason) will not be taken into account. This results in 65% voluntary transitions and 38% forced transitions.<sup>18</sup>

**Table 7 Factors leading to change of job**

	Working	Not working	Total
Forced, labour market-related	31%	35%	32%
Forced, health-related	3%	11%	6%
Voluntary, labour market-related	47%	7%	32%
Voluntary, household-related	4%	11%	6%
Voluntary, other career breaks	8%	7%	8%
Retirement	0%	27%	10%
No/other reasons	13%	7%	11%

Only minor differences are found between male and female respondents when it comes to being forced to leave a previous employer or doing so voluntarily. Men proportionally make slightly more forced (and fewer voluntary) transitions than women, but the difference is quite small (see Figure 25).

However, the differences between the various age groups are very interesting.<sup>19</sup> There is a U-shaped relationship between the age of the respondents and the degree to which they were forced

<sup>17</sup> The percentages do not necessarily add up to 100% because respondents could give up to three answers to the question on why they left their previous employer.

<sup>18</sup> Respondents could indicate both forced and voluntary reasons. Respondents who did so are counted in both categories. Note that these percentages do not reflect the number of forced vs voluntary transitions, since only people who are currently working are taken into account; the indicated percentage of voluntary transitions is higher than it would be if all people were to be taken into account.

<sup>19</sup> The eldest category of respondents (65+) is left out in the analysis because of the small number of cases.

to leave their previous employer. Young people (aged 15–24) are more likely to have been forced to leave their employer than the average (46% compared to 38%). In the 25–34 age group, the degree of self-determination is highest, with 69% voluntarily leaving their employer and 34% being forced to do so. Between the ages of 35 and 64, the percentage of people who voluntarily leave their employer steadily falls, to barely 48% in the 55–64 age group. The percentage of people who were forced to leave their employer, on the other hand, rises steeply with age, reaching 56% for the 55–64 age group.

Looking at the different reasons we have grouped as ‘forced’, it can be seen that the older a respondent is, the more likely they are to have been made redundant and the more they report leaving their employer for health reasons. Expiry of an employment contract is more often reported by the younger age groups – a logical finding, given the fact that it is mostly younger respondents who have non-permanent labour contracts.

**Figure 25 Voluntary vs. forced job mobility, by demographic characteristics (%)**




Figure 25 also shows the relationship between educational level and the proportion of forced vs. voluntary job transitions. Respondents who finished their full-time education between the ages of 16 and 19 are the most vulnerable: they have the highest level of forced transitions and the lowest level of voluntary transitions. Respondents in this category are made redundant much more often than those in other categories. Respondents in the highest category of educational attainment have the highest percentage of voluntary transitions and the lowest percentage of forced transitions. This is in line with what one would expect based on the human capital theory – the greater the human capital endowment an individual possesses, the better their chances of acquiring a new job or of moving to a job offering a higher wage or better career prospects (Muffels and Luijkx, 2004).


Analysing the influence of household structure on the reasons for leaving the previous employer, it is seen to be more or less what one would expect on the basis of the age profiles (*see above*). Respondents with children under the age of 14 living in the household are typically found in the age groups 25–34 and 35–44. These age and household categories share more than average levels

of voluntary transitions. In the analysis of levels of job mobility, it was found that lone parents are more mobile than respondents living in another household structure (see Figure 21). Here, we find that the high mobility of this group is not the result of forced transitions – any more than for other groups. This would confirm the idea that lone parents search more actively for the optimal balance of their private and professional lives. People with a partner but without children living in the household would typically be found in the older age groups; again, the age profile and household structure profile for these categories correspond, i.e. they both show a higher ratio of forced to voluntary transitions. Indeed, in the 55–64 age group, there is a higher proportion of forced transitions than voluntary.

The proportions of voluntary and forced transitions differ for natives and non-natives. An important distinction, however, is to be made between people who were born in another EU Member State and people born in a third country. People who were born in another EU country are better off in the sense that they more often voluntarily leave their employer and are less often forced to do so (73% compared to 28%). Non-natives from outside the EU are, by contrast, more likely to have been forced to leave their employer (41%).

In order to estimate the influence of job characteristics on the nature of the last job transition, it is necessary to look at the activity sector of the organisation in which the respondent was working before the transition, as well as the title of the respondent’s previous job (see Figure 26). The sectors regrouped here in the ‘industries’ category count almost as many forced transitions as voluntary transitions (51% and 53%). The manufacturing sector and the mining and quarrying sector, in particular, account for these high percentages (although the latter sector has very small numbers of cases). Forced health-related transitions occur slightly more often than average, but it is the high percentage of redundancies in the industries category that accounts for the high proportion of forced transitions.

**Figure 26 Reasons for transition, by job sector (%)**



People working in the ‘public services’ category are in the most favourable position: they are least likely to have been forced to leave their employer and most likely to have done so voluntarily. The

different sectors regrouped in this category show, however, quite different profiles: in the public administration and defence sector and in the education sector, forced transitions account for 45% and 39%, respectively, of all transitions. These high percentages are due mainly to the high proportion of employment contract expirations, and – in public administration and defence – to transitions due to health reasons. This means that people leave these low mobility sectors mainly because they did not get a permanent contract. People with permanent contracts in these public services are less likely to be forced to leave their employer. The health and social work sector has the highest percentage of voluntary transitions and the lowest percentage of forced transitions (77% and 27%, respectively).

The more highly skilled occupations<sup>20</sup> are better off in terms of the ratio of voluntary to forced transitions. Service class workers report the highest percentage of voluntary reasons for their last transition (75%) and the lowest percentage of forced reasons (27%). In contrast, the picture is the reverse for unskilled workers, who even report more forced transitions (55%) than voluntary transitions (53%). Redundancies increase as the skills level of the job decreases, for both white-collar and blue-collar workers. As might be expected, health-related transitions are more prevalent among manual workers than among white-collar workers.

A final influencing factor in this context is the former events in people's labour market careers (see *Figure 27*). Looking at the number of job changes and their relation to the character of the last transition, it is found that the more respondents have changed employer, the less likely it was that the last job change was on a voluntary basis, and, correspondingly, the greater the likelihood that the respondent was forced to leave his last employer. More particularly, it is found that when people change employer for the first time, this change is made on voluntary grounds in 76% of cases. People who have changed employer more than five times make fewer voluntary transitions, and more forced transitions, than average. Respondents who have changed employer more than 10 times report about as many voluntary as forced transitions.

Are people who have been unemployed before more likely to be forced to leave their employer than people who have never been involuntarily out of work for more than three months? This is quite clearly the case. Respondents who have never been unemployed leave their employer voluntarily in 77% of cases and are forced to do so only 25% of the time. This picture changes dramatically for people who have been unemployed before. Regardless of when in their career the spell of unemployment occurred, the likelihood that respondents who were unemployed once in their career leave their employer voluntarily falls to only 57%; the probability that they are forced to leave their employer increases to 47%. For people with two or more spells of unemployment in their career, the ratio of voluntary to forced transitions switches: they more often report having been forced to leave their employer than doing so voluntarily.


These conclusions throw further light on the phenomenon of job mobility and confirm the existence of a dual labour market. It seems that job mobility has positive outcomes (e.g. in the development of skills and the employability of people), but also tends to be a peculiarity of more vulnerable groups in the labour market. People who have been unemployed often before, lone parents, blue-

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<sup>20</sup> Note that the Eurobarometer survey data did not permit the singling out of people who were self-employed in their previous job. The regrouping of the job titles on ISCO88 2-digit level has been done on the basis of Ganzeboom and Treiman (2006).

collar workers or people with temporary contracts change employer more often than average. When the reason for the last transition is examined, it is found that job mobility for these groups is less often a free choice than for other, 'stronger' groups; the outcome then is far less positive.

**Figure 27 Voluntary vs. forced job mobility, by number of job changes and unemployment spells (%)**




Instead of making people better off (e.g. by increasing their flexibility and employability), job mobility may be the sign of a negative spiral. Because of their specific position in the labour market, their household situation or previous events in their career, people who often have to change employer may more easily become discouraged and end up withdrawing from the labour market. It is therefore important that special attention is paid to these groups and that the factors that render them more vulnerable are dealt with separately. In this way, job mobility for these groups can be a positive choice. At the same time, the labour market transitions of stronger groups should be enhanced.

### Future job mobility

The final part of this discussion on job mobility from a life-course perspective is expected future mobility. An analysis of respondents' expectations about changing employer shows that 41% of all respondents who are currently working indicate that they expect to change their current job in the next five years, while 54% are not planning on changing employer and the rest (5%) are undecided. (The 'undecided' group is not included in further analyses below.)


Again, there are large differences between EU Member States (see Figure 28). In line with the findings on current job mobility in previous sections, analysis here shows that mobility expectations are highest in those countries with social-democratic and liberal welfare state regimes. The high job mobility of the Baltic countries is also confirmed by their expected future mobility. Citizens of Portugal and Italy are least inclined to change their employer. Corporatist welfare state regimes, such as Austria and Belgium (but with the exception of France), score low on job mobility expectations.

**Figure 28** Percentage of people who expect to change job in the next five years, by country



In previous sections, similar levels of current job mobility have been found between men and women. Here, however, the data show that men are slightly less inclined to change jobs than women (see Figure 29). Since women mostly perform the lion’s share of caring and household duties, it is assumed that they are more willing to change employer in their search for the optimal combination of working and personal life. Younger people are more willing to change their current job.

**Figure 29** Percentage of people who think they will change job in the next five years, by demographic characteristics




Higher educational levels are associated with higher job mobility intentions: 41% of the respondents who had finished their full-time education between the ages of 16 and 19 intend to change employer in the next five years. For those who were 20 years or older when they finished their full-time education, this percentage amounts to 48%. The human capital theory suggests that people who are better endowed with human capital (as a result, say, of higher education) are more likely to find better jobs than people with a poorer human capital endowment. The incentive to change jobs for better educated respondents is higher because they are more likely to improve their situation than are less well-educated respondents.

People without a partner are more inclined to change their job in the next five years (and less reluctant to do so) than people who are living with a partner. It is plausible that single people have fewer economic resources at their disposal than people with a partner (in the sense that in single households all costs are born by only one wage-earner). The need to search for a better paid job may therefore be higher for single people than for people living with a partner.

It is interesting to note that job mobility expectations are higher than actual job mobility. The percentage of respondents who have moved job in the last five years (32%) is much lower than the percentage who said they expected to change their current job within the next five years (43%). Some caution is therefore needed when making predictions about the future on the basis of stated job mobility expectations.

As Figure 30 shows, the more that people have moved in their entire career or in the recent past (as expressed by average job duration and most recent change of employer respectively), the more they expressed an expectation to move again in the next five years. As found previously, the ‘never mobile’ respondents (those aged 35 years or over who have never changed employer in their entire career) are especially reluctant to change employer in the future.

**Figure 30 Percentage of people who expect to change job in the next five years, by indicators of past job mobility**



### Voluntary vs. forced expected mobility


It is possible to distinguish three classes of reasons that people put forward for expecting to change their job within the next five years.

- Voluntary reasons include the belief that they will find a better job, not liking the current job and the fact that the respondent enjoys change. These reasons indicate a positive attitude to possible future job mobility: changing employer is a choice.
- Forced reasons, in contrast, include the respondent's expectation that they will be made redundant and the knowledge that their contract will expire. These reasons are negative because future job mobility becomes a necessity rather than a choice.
- Neutral reasons include the fact that the respondent will move away; responses given in the category 'other' are also classified as neutral.

Of those respondents who indicated that they planned to change their current job, 64% gave one or more voluntary reasons. 51% said that the belief that they would find a better job was the most important voluntary reason. Forced reasons for expecting to have to change current job were given by 24% of respondents, while 26% gave neutral reasons.<sup>21</sup>

The breakdown of the stated reasons on a country basis is informative (see Figure 31). The highest proportions of respondents expecting to make voluntary transitions are found in the Scandinavian and Baltic countries, as well as in Greece. High GDP growth rates may form the basis for these expectations, as in the Baltic countries. The opposite is the case for Germany, for example, which currently faces a period of low economic growth: 36% of the German respondents who are planning on changing their job give negative, or forced, reasons for doing so. Other countries that have high percentages of negative reasons are Poland, Slovakia and Portugal.

**Figure 31 Reasons for expected mobility, by country (%)**



<sup>21</sup> Since more than one answer was possible for the survey question, the percentages do not add up to 100%.

## Main findings and conclusions

The first event in job mobility from a life-course perspective is entry to the labour market. Respondents to the 2005 Eurobarometer mobility survey started their first job on average at the age of 19. Some of them, however, have never had a job: out of all respondents aged 35 or over, 8% have never worked. Among the respondents who did start working, a high percentage of them have only worked with one employer: 25% of those aged 35 or over have never moved jobs in their entire career.

The average number of jobs in the labour market career is 3.9; the corresponding average job duration over the whole career is 8.3 years. Analysing the most recent change of employer, 8% of the currently working respondents have made this transition within the last year, while 32% have changed employer at least once in the last five years and 50% in the last 10 years.

Of those transitions made within the last five years, 65% were made on a voluntary basis, while 38% were the result of having been forced to change employer. As regards future job mobility, analysis of mobility intentions shows that 43% think that they will change employer in the next five years. Voluntary reasons for expecting to change their current job are given by 64%, while 24% give forced reasons and 26% give neutral reasons.

Comparing these results to earlier findings on job mobility, or to findings in other countries, is complex because of the scarcity of data and the ever-differing definitions and computation methods used. Cautious comparison with earlier data on job mobility would lead to the conclusion that job mobility has slightly increased. In the 2001 edition of the Eurobarometer mobility survey (EB 54.2), 29% of the respondents reported having changed jobs over the last five years. The corresponding percentage found in the 2005 survey (EB 64.1) is 32%, which would point to a slight increase in rates of job mobility in the EU15 over the last five years. Other sources confirm that job mobility has been relatively stable over the years. For example, Graversen *et al* (2001) found that job mobility in the Scandinavian countries had more or less remained at the same level between 1988 and 1997. Based on figures of job tenure, European job mobility occupies a middle ground between American and Japanese job mobility (Auer, 2005).

Throughout this discussion, it is clear that there are important differences in job mobility between EU Member States and that these are more or less consistent over all aspects of occupational mobility. Year-to-year job mobility varies from almost 0% (in Malta) to 16% of all working people (in Denmark). There seems to be a correlation between high levels of job mobility and the classification of welfare state regimes, as defined by Esping-Andersen (1990). At the high end of the job mobility scale are the social-democratic and liberal welfare state countries. Denmark is the most mobile of the social-democratic countries, although the other three countries in that category (Sweden, Finland and the Netherlands) also score highly on the different aspects of mobility. Of the liberal welfare states, the UK displays higher job mobility than does Ireland. A last group of 'mobile' countries consists of some of the NMS – the Baltic countries of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

The group showing the lowest overall job mobility comprises the southern European countries of Portugal, Greece, Italy and Spain (although Spain is somewhat of an exception since it often shows job mobility levels that are close to or even above the EU average). Malta can clearly be added to

this last group since it displays a comparably low job mobility level. Cyprus, on the other hand, shows higher job mobility and should therefore not be classified within this group of countries.

The corporatist welfare state regimes (Germany, France, Belgium, Austria and Luxembourg) and the five remaining NMS (Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia) share the middle position on the scale of high-to-low job mobility. In the group of corporatist countries, Austria is the least mobile, with job mobility levels similar to those of some Mediterranean countries (*see above*); France, on the other hand, consistently shows a higher-than-average job mobility. Hungary is by far the most occupationally mobile country of the NMS in this group.

A final important conclusion to be drawn from these findings is that there are two sides to the job mobility story. If institutional arrangements are such that security and flexibility go hand in hand, job mobility is indeed a good thing and both the economy and the individual worker may benefit from it. A good example is Denmark, where a flexible labour market is combined with generous financial support for unemployed people and where active labour market policies enhance the employability of those who do not immediately find a new job.

The present findings, however, indicate that job mobility is more prominent among the more vulnerable groups in the labour market. Moreover, people in these groups are more likely to be forced to change employer than people in other groups. When job mobility is no longer a matter of free choice but rather a survival mechanism, the outcome is far less positive, especially for employees themselves. This applies particularly to vulnerable groups such as single parents, blue-collar workers, people with non-permanent labour contracts and people who have been unemployed for more than three months at least once during their career. A feature common to all these groups is their considerably higher levels of job mobility compared to other groups.

# Opinions and attitudes towards geographical and job mobility

The 2005 Eurobarometer mobility survey sought opinions from people in the EU25 on geographical and job mobility. Opinions are a reasonably strong predictor of people's later readiness to move. At first glance, the relationship between geographical and job mobility seems straightforward: people are dependent on work and work is still predominantly tied to locations. But even if geographical mobility is not directly connected to one's own labour market move, it often still implies an employment change (e.g. when following a partner or other relatives). To understand related decision-making processes on the level of the household or the individual, the following basic questions are addressed here: How do individuals generally perceive mobility? Can commuting be a functional equivalent to geographical mobility? Are the levels of geographical and job mobility related? Can countries be grouped according to different national mobility policies within Europe?

Links between geographical and job mobility can be complex, both at individual and societal level. From an economic point of view, geographical mobility is frequently put forward as a precondition for successful labour market integration of individuals. Possible advantages of geographical mobility are the enhancement of employment opportunities, greater economic well-being and the prevention of unemployment. However, not everybody can make use of these options and some people, particularly families, may be more inclined to have combined trajectories of job and geographical mobility than others.

From a social point of view, a geographical move and/or change of residence can lead to a better job (at least subjectively), with consequent greater motivation and satisfaction for the individual. In addition, it can prevent the social exclusion caused by unemployment. One of the possible negative effects of such a move is the loss of social networks, which may lead to the need to purchase services, such as childcare or care for elderly and dependant relatives; in turn, this can lead to additional costs for services that were previously supplied by the wider familial or social network. Another negative effect could be the arising of difficulties in coordinating the employment careers of both spouses, with consequences for the household and its work-life balance.

On a societal level, the optimal matching of job vacancies and suitably qualified job-seekers is an important element of sustainable growth (European Commission, 2005; OECD, 2005). However, the combination of geographical and job mobility can also lead to the selective migration of young people (the 'brain drain'), as well as a decrease in social cohesion in some regions. Currently, total net migration rates are below 0.3% in most OECD countries (OECD, 2005). A necessary precondition for the optimal matching of vacancies and jobseekers, however, is people's willingness to move, whether between jobs, regions, other EU countries or beyond.

There may be a reluctance within different groups in society to move to wherever jobs are vacant (job-hopping does not necessarily imply a residential move). Similar to the theoretical concept of bounded rationality (Kahnemann, 2003), 'bounded mobility' may also exist, i.e. a person optimising job mobility within a predefined geographical context – a town/city, region or country. Since job mobility is then conditional on geographical location and restricted geographical flexibility, there exists an obvious link between the two issues. The 2005 Eurobarometer mobility survey provides a unique opportunity to assess the validity of this argument of 'bounded mobility' within and across the EU25.

The literature on job and geographical mobility shows that several forms of selectivity occur in the decision-making process of mobility, including selectivity by age or birth cohorts, by level of education, by marital status and/or labour market status. In the realm of gender mainstreaming, it is important to highlight gender differentials in the various forms of mobility: job mobility, and even broader labour market mobility, is one of several key ways of overcoming gender segregation. But here again, it is important to examine the regional context and restricted job search processes due to geographical immobility, in order to derive relevant conclusions for policy.

The discussion below on the interrelationship between geographical and job mobility within the EU explores the following areas:

- the general perception of mobility among EU citizens;
- readiness to move in case of unemployment;
- the potential of commuting as a functional equivalent to geographical mobility;
- the corresponding levels of geographical and job mobility, and whether both types of mobility function as substitutes or complement each other;
- the degree of mobility in the EU25 and whether this reflects distinct country clusters in terms of welfare state arrangements and national policies.

### **Opinions and attitudes towards mobility**


The latest Eurobarometer data on the opinions and attitudes of European citizens towards geographical and job mobility provide crucial information on current preferences and values, which to some extent can be used to gauge policy and even change it as necessary. The main questions addressed here are: Which groups in society value mobility the most? Who are the people who enjoy being mobile? Do European citizens generally perceive mobility as a good or a bad thing?

It should be kept in mind that such an assessment of attitudes and opinions cannot be interpreted as intentions. In other words, people generally may think that geographical mobility is a good thing, but they themselves have no intention of, or interest in, moving. Therefore, a distinction needs to be made between general attitudes towards mobility and how people perceive mobility for themselves.

The survey looked first at general opinions about geographical mobility. European citizens were asked whether they generally perceived geographical mobility as a good or a bad thing, or neither good nor bad with reference to five different life domains: European integration, the labour market, the economy, families and individuals (see Figure 32).

Across the EU, geographical mobility is generally perceived as a 'good thing' for European integration by a solid majority of 62% of all respondents. Including indifferent respondents ('neither a good nor a bad thing'), almost 90% believe that geographical mobility is not a bad thing for European integration. Hence, any policy measures by individual countries or the EU as a whole that favour geographical mobility in general would be welcomed by a large majority of European citizens.

**Figure 32 Attitudes towards geographical mobility for different life domains (%)**



Responses in favour of the statement that geographical mobility is a good thing for ‘the labour market’ or for ‘the economy’ are very similar. Even ratings for the indicator ‘a good thing for individuals’ are close to 50%. In contrast to this, geographical mobility is most frequently regarded as a bad thing for ‘families’ and only one out of three Europeans would say it is a good thing for families. This highlights the fact that, in the perceptions of EU citizens, families seem to be carrying most of the burden of geographical mobility. In view of the current widespread political debate on low fertility in the EU and the central role that families or partnerships play in determining fertility, it is a matter of concern that more geographical mobility might hinder a reversal of the trend of low fertility. This topic would, however, need more thorough analysis before any conclusions could be drawn.


The perception of geographical mobility as a good or a bad thing varies with age and the level of educational attainment of EU citizens (and also with gender – *see below*). In line with previous research (Krieger, 2004), better educated respondents more frequently view moving across regions as ‘a good thing’ for all given life domains. (This concurs with the findings in Chapter 2, where better educated individuals are also found to be more geographically mobile.) Positive experiences of geographical moves may lead to a more favourable evaluation of geographical mobility by better educated people. Furthermore, in order to gain entry to higher education, people usually have to leave their region of origin or the family home for the first time, which tends to set them up for a more mobile future. Hence, it would appear that geographical mobility can be learned; once such mobility is achieved, it then seems in the majority of cases to be generally regarded as a good thing.

The perception of mobility as a good thing decreases with age across all life domains. These results are in line with research on actual geographical mobility behaviour. A stable trend of declining geographical mobility with age, as found in the Eurobarometer mobility survey and in the literature on migration (Krieger, 2004), is reflected in general attitudes towards geographical mobility, as well as in the likely impact of mobility.

Gender is an important issue in relation to people’s attitudes towards geographical mobility (*see Figure 33*). Previous research also shows that family decisions and behaviour on migration are

strongly affected by gender role beliefs and marital status (Jürges, 2005). A higher percentage of men than women generally think that mobility is a good thing for all aspects of life.

**Figure 33 Attitudes towards geographical mobility, by gender (%)**



The differences between men and women are most pronounced in the employment-related domains of ‘the labour market’ and ‘the economy’. An employment-related move by a husband, who is often the primary provider of income to the family, frequently determines the family decision. Regardless of the employment prospects of the spouse, low-earning or housekeeping wives are often expected to follow in order to keep the family together. There are only small differences observed in attitudes towards geographical mobility in the domains of ‘a good thing for families’ or a ‘good thing for individuals’. Men and women are equally aware of the fact that geographical mobility is less good for families, but the costs seem to fall more on women, considering their higher time investment in family and household work.

### Readiness to move in case of unemployment


The litmus test for attitudes towards geographical mobility occurs when a person or member of the family or household becomes unemployed. Most economic theories of labour market processes assume that people are ready to move to where the jobs are. This assumption is examined below, to see if EU citizens really share this belief, and what their intentions to move are in case they as individuals are at risk of unemployment.

The readiness to move location constitutes an important precondition for finding a new job, particularly in regions undergoing economic restructuring (Sjaastad, 1962). However, a lack of resources may inhibit an otherwise gainful move to re-enter employment, especially for the low-skilled and/or lower income groups, who can be at risk of becoming ‘locked in’ to not moving. In regions with high unemployment rates, people tend to substitute a lack of (mobile) resources, such as capital, with immobile resources, such as the provision of resources within informal networks. Home-ownership is another factor that ties people to a location, if property prices are low and if the rent in a different area is not affordable.

When asked ‘If you were unemployed and had difficulties finding a job, would you be willing to move to another region or country to find one?’, 31% of respondents said they were ready to move, both to another region or another country within the EU; 6% even reported being ready to move to another country outside the EU. Another 29% were willing to move to another region only. About one-third (30%) of the EU25 population is not ready to move at all. These results should, however, be interpreted with caution since the question is likely to be sensitive to a bias caused by social desirability: not being willing to move in case of unemployment logically implies that one is, to an extent, responsible for one’s unemployment. Nevertheless, the evidence remains fairly clear cut: one out of three Europeans would not like to move even in the case of unemployment; one out of three Europeans would move within the region; and one out of three would consider moving long distances across regions. Only a small proportion would consider moving across country borders to overcome unemployment; language barriers and the binding forces of social networks are probably the most important barriers to this type of migration. Thus, a policy conclusion seems to be that stressing migration as a solution to unemployment is only a realistic option for a relatively restricted number of persons or families in the EU.

Figure 34 breaks down the readiness to move in case of unemployment by age and by gender. It shows that, on average, more women than men would not move under any circumstances (34% as against 24%). However, for those people who are willing to move to another region or another country within the EU, the proportions of men and women are almost equal. A noticeable gender difference occurs when considering a move to another country outside the EU, with men (36%) being more willing to move than women (27%). This finding is in line with the claim that in Europe the traditional male ‘breadwinner’ family model is still important in forming attitudes and propensities towards mobility. Men tend to feel responsible for earning sufficient income and therefore would be more willing to move if they faced unemployment than would women (Jürges, 2005). This supports the rationale that we face a higher ‘bounded mobility’ for women than for men in the EU.

**Figure 34 Readiness to move in case of unemployment, by age, gender and home-ownership (%)**



Contrasting the readiness to move in case of unemployment with type of housing shows that those who rent from a private landlord are most frequently willing to move, with only 22% reporting an unwillingness. A lack of initial resources seems to inhibit the mobility of the most disadvantaged groups, many of whom live in social housing. A high percentage (37%) of people paying rent in social housing say that they would not be willing to move in case of unemployment.

The final analysis of readiness to move in case of unemployment is by age. According to human capital theory (Becker, 1993; Mincer, 1993), a person will invest in human capital if the expected returns exceed the expected costs. With increasing age, people will invest less since the remaining time in which the revenue from increased productivity can be obtained is shorter. Geographical mobility in the event of unemployment is an important way of realising high returns to human capital. However, as people approach retirement, the expected return from gainful employment is lower, simply because of the shorter time left in the labour market. Consequently, as an individual gets older, a declining willingness to move in the event of unemployment can be expected. In addition, people's needs and priorities may change with age: resources provided by informal networks – such as care or support in everyday activities – become more important with increasing age and decreasing health, and this also alters the perceived costs and benefits of moving.

The survey data confirm the above points: there is a clear age bias, with older people showing a lower overall willingness to move in case of unemployment. In addition, readiness to move to another country outside the EU, or either to another country or another region within the EU, decreases with increasing age. By contrast, no clear age trend is found concerning the willingness to move to another region only.

### **Commuting as a substitute for geographical mobility?**


In the literature on geographical mobility, a distinction is frequently made between migration and residential mobility (Jürges, 2005). Migration refers to long-distance mobility, primarily across borders. Residential mobility means short-distance mobility within a small regional unit – a town or a city. Commuting time plays a crucial role as a potential substitute for residential mobility related to job changes and can be regarded as a functional equivalent of residential mobility. The trade-off between residential mobility and commuting depends heavily on public infrastructure in terms of provision of public transport to commuters, fast railway networks, good road systems and, of course, on moderate petrol (energy) prices and government subsidies.

From a policy point of view, both desirable and undesirable side-effects may stem from longer commuting times as a functional equivalent of residential mobility. Positive effects of commuting include people not having to leave a location where they would like to stay; people being able to stay close to their extended family (e.g. grandparents), which usually provides help with childcare and other household duties for dual-earner couples; and couples having more flexibility in choosing the most appropriate job without having to move. On the other hand, commuting is costly for the individual and the economy. Commuting time cannot be considered as either work or leisure (Becker, 1965): long commuting times impose an additional burden. Furthermore, on the macro level, longer commuting times conflict with the policy goals of a better work–life balance (since more time and money has to be spent on work-related activities) and also with the policy goal of minimising the traffic load to protect the environment.

From the perspective of rational choice theory, individuals will choose longer commuting times if the opportunity costs of the time (and other resources) spent on commuting are lower than the costs of moving (Becker, 1965). On the monetary level, the opportunity costs for commuting comprise the lost earnings (the money that could have been earned during the time spent commuting) and the direct costs of commuting. The latter, of course, depend greatly on quality of infrastructure and provision of low-cost public transport. Consequently, the opportunity costs of commuting increase with income and the cost of transportation.

The 2005 Eurobarometer mobility survey provides information on the time spent commuting by citizens of the EU25 (see Figure 35). The data are sorted in ascending order by the proportion of commuters who travel for more than 60 minutes per day. Hungary (24%), the Netherlands (22%) and Latvia (21%) have the highest proportions of long-distance commuters, whereas Luxembourg (8%), Italy (10%) and Portugal (10%) have the lowest. In the EU average of 25 countries, a commuting time of 16–30 minutes per day is most frequent (31%); 4% report no commuting time at all; and 15% commute for more than 60 minutes per day. Taking a broad overview, there seems to be a tendency for countries with an above-average employment rate to also have the highest percentages of people commuting very long distances or needing more than 60 minutes per day to get to work (with several exceptions).


Figure 35 Commuting time, by country (%)



Commuting time varies substantially across the EU25; it also varies on the individual level across the socio-economic characteristics of age, gender, educational level and the number of young children (less than 10 years of age) in a household (see Figure 36). Commuting is, of course, most prevalent among the core working population, i.e. the age groups 25–34, 35–44 and 44–54. These are also the groups with the highest employment rates in the labour market. A commuting time of 16–30 minutes per day is generally the most common across all age groups. Short commuting times are most common in the oldest age group (65 years and over). For both men and women, the most common commuting time is 16–30 minutes; men however, generally tend to commute longer distances than women.

In line with previous findings, commuting time increases for people with higher levels of education: 70% of those who finished their full-time education at the age of 15 commute for less than 30 minutes per day, as against 54% of those who finished after the age of 20; the respective figures for commutes of more than 60 minutes per day are 11% and 18%. This indicates that commuting takes the role of a functional equivalent of geographical mobility, especially for better educated people. If geographical mobility is of greater importance in highly skilled jobs, the better educated may opt for longer commuting times rather than more frequent residential moves. Suburbanisation may also be an important factor, with better educated (and therefore presumably wealthier) people preferring to live in suburban areas while working ‘downtown’.

**Figure 36 Commuting time, by demographic characteristics (%)**



These findings give some support to the view that commuting acts as a functional equivalent of job-related geographical mobility. However, the results indicate a rather complex relationship between the location of the workplace and commuting time, which may depend on a number of interrelated factors, such as socio-economic status, financial situation, personal circumstances, infrastructure, public transportation and housing-related issues.

Home-ownership is one of the factors that might lead people to commute long distances rather than make an interregional move. In this sense, commuting would be a functional equivalent of geographical mobility. There are two conflicting forces concerning commuting time in connection with housing: a rise in earnings increases the cost of commuting because of higher lost earnings, but if an increase in earnings leads to an increase in the demand for space, it would lead to an increase in commuting time as long as housing is a superior good (Becker, 1965).

As Table 8 shows, people who own a house and hold a mortgage have the highest proportion of long-distance commuters: 17% commute over 60 minutes per day, although the difference is rather small compared to the other housing types. People who own a house without a mortgage, however, have the highest percentages in the three lowest categories of commuting time (0 minutes, less than 15 minutes and 16–30 minutes per day).

**Table 8 Commuting time, by home-ownership (%)**

	0 minutes	Less than 15 mins per day	16–30 mins per day	31–60 mins per day	More than 60 mins per day	Total EU25
Own home, without mortgage	6	26	32	24	12	100% (3,823)
Own home, with mortgage	4	20	30	29	17	100% (3,741)
Rent home, in social housing	3	25	31	27	14	100% (1,028)
Rent home, from private landlord	3	25	31	26	15	100% (2,029)
Total EU25	4 (445)	24 (2,523)	31 (3,286)	27 (2,825)	15 (1,542)	100% (10,621)

Source: Eurobarometer 64.1, W14, entire population in %

These findings show a non-linear or polarisation effect of home-ownership, which suggests that owning a home with a mortgage prolongs commuting time, while owning a home without a mortgage shortens commuting time. Possibly, general wealth and earnings, as well as country-specific effects concerning the flexibility of mortgage loans to shift loans to other homes, contribute to the explanation of these results.

### Links between levels of geographical and labour market mobility

So far, Chapters 2 and 3 have suggested that there is some interrelationship between geographical and labour market mobility. Looking now at the relationship between levels of geographical and labour market mobility, analysis shows that there is no simple link between the number of job changes and the number of geographical moves for people aged 35 years or over (*see Figure 37*). This age group was selected to allow for sufficient time in which people are ‘at risk’ of moving or changing jobs in order to get more than a snapshot of the relationship between geographical and job mobility.


As Figure 37 shows, among those people who never moved out of the parental home or only moved once afterwards, the single largest group never changed jobs either – 35%.<sup>22</sup> Of those who moved home between two and four times, by contrast, the single largest group changed job between five and nine times (just over 35%). And almost 50% of those who moved home five times or more also changed their job between five and nine times. Frequent job-hoppers are also likely to move to new places more often.

This result has interesting implications for European policies aimed at facilitating geographical and labour market mobility. Imperfect capital markets, such as inflexible transfer possibilities for mortgages, impede geographical mobility and increase the commuting times of home-owners with mortgages. Hence, inflexible capital markets may contribute to the polarisation of society into groups of highly mobile people (in both geographical and labour market sense) and groups of ‘bounded rational’ people, who find it difficult to achieve either type of mobility.

<sup>22</sup> People who are still living in their parental home could have moved with their parents or could live in a self-contained flat with separate entrance (a so-called ‘granny flat’). We do not consider mobility within the parental context here.

This polarisation has only a small gender dimension to it (see Table 9). The grouping applied is: labour market stability (never having changed job) versus labour market mobility (having changed job at least once), as well as geographical stability (never having moved after leaving parental home) versus geographical mobility (having moved at least once after leaving parental home).

**Figure 37** Number of job changes by number of moves after leaving parental home for people aged 35+ (%)



**Table 9** Geographical and labour market mobility vs. stability, by sex (%)

	Labour market stable	Labour market mobile	Total EU25
<b>Female</b>			
Geographically stable	38	62	100% (492)
Geographically mobile	19	81	100% (2,314)
Total	22	78	100% (2,805)
<b>Male</b>			
Geographically stable	33	67	100% (614)
Geographically mobile	17	83	100% (2,336)
Total	20	80	100% (2,950)

A combined mobility in terms of both geography and the labour market is the most common combination for men and women (83% and 81% respectively). Women who are geographically stable are more likely to be occupationally stable than are men (38% as against 33%). By contrast, a higher proportion of men are geographically stable, but occupationally mobile – 67% of men as against 62% of women. The least frequent combination is geographical mobility combined with labour market stability for men and women (19% and 17% respectively).

A comparison of ‘bounded flexible’ people with highly flexible people has an age dimension to it rather than a gender dimension (see Table 10). The proportion of those who are geographically stable and also occupationally stable clearly increases with age, from 32% in the age group 35–44 to 50% in the age group 65 and over. However, because of the retrospective nature of the questions

about the number of previous moves and previous jobs, this trend is better understood as a cohort effect rather than an age effect. The proportion of those who are geographically mobile and also occupationally mobile falls with increasing age.

**Table 10 Geographical and labour market mobility vs. stability, by age group (%)**

Age groups	Stable in the labour market	Mobile in the labour market	Total EU25
<b>35–44</b>			
Geographically stable	32	68	100% (910)
Geographically mobile	17	83	100% (3,458)
Total	20	80	100% (4,368)
<b>45–54</b>			
Geographically stable	37	63	100% (736)
Geographically mobile	18	82	100% (3,023)
Total	22	78	100% (3,759)
<b>55–64</b>			
Geographically stable	43	57	100% (554)
Geographically mobile	19	81	100% (2,309)
Total	23	77	100% (2,862)
<b>65+</b>			
Geographically stable	50	50	100% (824)
Geographically mobile	24	76	100% (3,161)
Total	29	71	100% (3,986)

### **Geographical or labour market mobility – alternatives or complementary?**

Are geographical and labour market mobility alternatives or substitutes in the optimisation of happiness, wealth and work–life balance? Some authors argue that both are intrinsically linked and so complement each other. At least in theory, geographical and labour market mobility can exist in either a substitutive/alternative or combined/complementary relationship. Labour market mobility can substitute for geographical mobility – for example, when a job loss would either require a change of location or a labour market move (to a different sector of the economy). On the other hand, it is argued that geographical and labour market mobility are interdependent and mutually reinforcing, and thus have a complementary relationship.

The duration of job search in relation to the location of a job gives information on whether geographical and job mobility act as complements. If the search time is reduced for geographically mobile people, geographical and labour market mobility can be regarded as complements rather than substitutes. Generally, most people find their first job in the same location as where they currently live (see Table 11).

The longest search times were associated with those who found their first job near their place of residence: of those who took more than three years after the end of full-time education to start their first job, 57% found that first job in the same city, town or village as where they currently live. Those who found their first job within one year or less most frequently found that job in a different region in the same country (21% and 19%). The proportion of people who found their first job in a

different region declines with lengthening search time. We can assume that those whose first job was in a different region from the one they currently inhabit have an overall greater willingness to move, which may have shortened their time spent job-hunting between the end of full-time education and the beginning of their first job. In this sense, these findings support the assumption that geographical and labour market mobility function as complements. Learning to be mobile in one form assists mobility in the other.

**Table 11 Location of first job, by search time and sex (%)**

	Same city/ town/village as now	Different city/town/ village, same region	Different region, same country	Different country, in EU	Different country, outside EU	Total EU25
<b>Total EU25</b> (search time)	46 (8,657)	33 (6,174)	17 (3,232)	2 (367)	2 (381)	100 (18,811)
Less than 1 year	42	32	21	2	3	100 (4,578)
1 year	44	34	19	2	1	100 (6,251)
1–2 years	45	35	16	2	2	100 (2,918)
2–3 years	48	33	15	2	2	100 (2,567)
More than 3 years	57	27	11	3	2	100 (2,497)
<b>Sex</b>						
Female	46	32	17	2	2	100 (10,023)
Male	48	32	17	2	2	100 (10,254)
<b>Age group</b>						
15–24	56	33	9	2	1	100 (1,228)
25–34	49	32	15	2	2	100 (3,433)
35–44	43	37	15	2	2	100 (4,531)
45–54	45	33	18	2	2	100 (3,900)
55–64	46	31	19	2	2	100 (2,960)
65+	50	26	20	2	2	100 (4,227)
<b>Education</b>						
Low	55	28	13	2	2	100 (5,107)
Average	47	34	16	2	2	100 (9,212)
High	39	33	23	2	3	100 (5,497)

Source: Eurobarometer 64.1, W14, entire population in %

There are no differences in search time by location of first job between men and women. But the location of the first job in relation to where a person currently lives does vary with age: young people (those in the 15–24 age group) most frequently report getting their first job in the same location as where they now live (56%), as they are the most likely to still be in their first job. This reflects a life-course effect: the older a person is, the more time they have had to move and so the more frequently they found their first job in a region other than where they now live.

Previous research has shown that better educated people tend to have more geographically distributed social networks (Fischer, 1982). Therefore, the tendency of close, local social networks to dampen willingness to relocate in search of jobs elsewhere should be less for better educated individuals. Moreover, information on job vacancies is often first transmitted through informal


networks (Granovetter, 1973). Consequently, those with geographically more widespread social networks will receive better information on jobs in other locations (Jürges, 2005). This also implies that people with locally centred and isolated networks will often not receive crucial information on vacancies in more distant locations. Highly educated people are the group most likely to have found their first job in a different region (23%, as against 16% for those with an average level of education and 13% for those with a low level of education). Respondents with a low level of education most frequently (55%) found their first job in the same village, town or city as where they now live.

There seems to be some moderate support for the view that better educated people are able to make virtuous combinations of geographical and labour market mobility, whereas the least educated groups in society seem to be more likely to substitute one form of mobility for the other. A more in-depth analysis of the complex relationship of interrelated processes would be required in order to disentangle these effects, further controlling for other background variables known to be important in one or other process.

**Different mobility patterns within the EU**

The evidence from EU25 averages has indicated the need to further disaggregate and look into country-specific patterns of mobility. Analysis of the data by country shows that within Europe, levels of geographical mobility and job mobility coincide (see Figure 38). Countries with high geographical mobility tend to be countries where people change jobs more often. It seems that some countries generate mobility on different societal levels, whereas other countries create a more stable environment. In Figure 38, the percentage of people who ever moved home (after leaving the parental home, on the x-axis) is related to the percentage of people who have ever changed employer (on the y-axis).

**Figure 38 Correlation of geographical with labour market mobility (%)**



One observation that can be made by looking at Figure 38 is that the scattering of countries in the figure forms a loose, upward-sloping diagonal; this indicates a positive correlation between the levels of both mobility types. In short, this means that countries with a high proportion of citizens changing residence are also countries with high levels of job mobility. This supports a view of Europe as being polarised into mobile, or less mobile, countries in the two dimensions of mobility.

The results can also be interpreted in terms of clusters – either regional, or of employment and welfare regimes. In Figure 38, the interregional differences within Europe are emphasised by regrouping the Member States into different groups. The regrouping is deduced through a hierarchical cluster analysis based on both characteristics.<sup>23</sup> Broadly speaking, the 25 countries are divided into four groups:

- **Four Mediterranean countries (Malta, Greece, Italy and Portugal) and four central European countries (Slovakia, Poland, Slovenia and Austria).** This cluster is characterised by a generally low mobility profile. A relatively low number of people moved residence and job mobility is lower than the European average. It is important to note that these countries also face a low to moderate level of international mobility.
- **Two Mediterranean countries (Spain and Cyprus) and two central European countries (the Czech Republic and Hungary).** These countries have a low level of residential mobility, but a higher number of people changing jobs.
- **Germany, France, Belgium, Luxembourg and Ireland.** These five countries form a cluster in which geographical mobility is more prominent, but job mobility is moderate. Local, interregional and intra-EU mobility all feature in these countries. This international mobility is very apparent in Luxembourg and Ireland. Intra-EU mobility in both Germany and Belgium is at the average level. France scores slightly below average in terms of intra-EU mobility, but more people living in France have moved outside Europe.
- **Nordic countries (Denmark, Sweden and Finland), Baltic countries (Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia) and the UK and the Netherlands.** All these northern European countries show high levels of both geographical and job mobility. The highest mobility rates are found in the Nordic countries and the UK, the Baltic countries and the Netherlands following close behind.

The division of European countries according to their mobility profile shows a remarkable resemblance to the welfare state typology devised by Esping-Andersen (1990). High mobility rates are found in the social-democratic and liberal welfare regimes (see Chapter 3). High levels of geographical mobility, but moderate job mobility are a characteristic of the corporatist welfare regimes. The southern European regime seems to be associated with low mobility. This correlation indicates that different welfare state regimes facilitate geographical mobility in different ways (Muffels *et al*, 2002). Welfare states that ‘provide or organise risk-sharing for (un)employment’ seem to have a similar organisation for residential issues (Schmid, 2006). These societies probably have a wider application of social insurance, stimulating citizens to consider both types of mobility as an option. This seems particularly relevant for the less educated groups, who would otherwise show more restricted mobility patterns.

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<sup>23</sup> The Ward Method has been used to cluster the 25 countries. Both variables were standardised.

A second important finding concerns the profile of the NMS. They are not clustered together in one group, but rather dispersed over three out of the four clusters: the Baltic countries of Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia are part of the most mobile cluster; Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia and Malta are situated in the cluster with the lowest mobility; and Cyprus, the Czech Republic and Hungary are in a cluster with an intermediate mobility profile. This confirms the fact that the NMS should not be considered as a group of countries apart from the EU15; there is as much diversity within these 10 'new' Member States as there is within the 15 'old' Member States.

Third, we ignore the huge differences within Europe when arguing that 'European' mobility is lower than mobility in the USA. It should be stressed that a considerable number of EU Member States have high mobility rates. In the eight countries of the 'mobile' cluster (the Nordic and Baltic countries, plus the UK and Netherlands), the average proportion of people who have moved after leaving the parental home is 90%. Within these countries, 86% of the working population have changed employer at least once in their career. Within the eight countries with the lowest mobility profile (Malta, Greece, etc.), in which people have a more 'stable' residence and job, the respective proportions are 67% and 63%. The differences between these groups of countries on other mobility indicators are just as evident.

## Conclusions

This discussion has shown that geographical and labour market mobility are essentially interdependent and interrelated processes that vary according to overall national welfare and mobility regimes. Above all, it seems that the strategy of frequently changing jobs and residence is more often applied by better educated social groups. The decision of whether to move geographically or to move job seems to be subject to specific forms of social selectivity. Throughout the analyses, we have found the expected selectivity in terms of major socio-economic characteristics, such as age, gender and, most importantly, level of education.

First, the assessment of what moving means may influence the decision to move and change job, although perceptions have to be distinguished from clear intentions. For example, people assume mobility to be 'a good thing' for the individual, whereas they deem it 'a bad thing' for the family. The results indicate that an individual's position in the life course plays an important role in the perception of mobility as a good or a bad thing; in addition, women are more aware of the potential costs of geographical mobility to family ties.

The great majority of Europeans are ready to move if faced with unemployment. Older people, however, are less willing to uproot themselves and, similarly, women are less willing to move than men in the event of unemployment. People in rented social housing, together with people who own a house without a mortgage, are the least willing to move. Different human capital endowments are most likely the source for the differences in willingness to move. A reluctance to move is probably based on very different motivations: a deliberate choice to stay as opposed to a refusal to move. A lower level of education, and/or the fact of living in social housing, reduces both the willingness to move and to change job.

The link between the levels of geographical and job mobility indicates a complex relationship between the two kinds of mobility. Findings suggest that geographical and job mobility have a complementary relationship, particularly for better educated groups. On the other hand, residential

mobility and commuting seem to function as substitutes, primarily for those who are less educated (although the relationship is not straightforward). Complementarity between geographical and job mobility suggests a mutually reinforcing effect, which can lead to the accumulation of inequality over the life course for people who do not have the initial resources or skills (including languages) to be more mobile.

Overall, the findings show that mobility – both on the labour market and across borders – is easily accomplished by the young, the better off and the well educated. However, most other groups would probably be happy to receive some sort of assistance to facilitate their geographical and job mobility within the EU or beyond. This finding supports the need to have EURES information centres or similar guidance services easily available in each Member State for those who may be less well informed, but who are still ready to move. Broadly speaking, such information brokers would operate as mobility agencies and thereby assist in the aim of making transitional or mobile labour markets work in practice.

Finally, welfare regimes have a not-insignificant impact on geographical and labour market mobility in each of the EU Member States. The major finding from this discussion is that job security and housing security, as well as flexibility in both areas, appear to be linked. This poses a challenge to policy-making for individual Member States, as well as for policy coordination in the EU as a whole. In a wider sense, living and working conditions are closely linked to job and geographical mobility, hence studying one without due recognition of the processes of the other might yield suboptimal outcomes.

The Lisbon Agenda, with its aim of making the EU the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, remains very prominent in the European policy discourse. There is a strong belief that increased opportunities for Europeans to change residence and/or jobs more freely can contribute to this aim. Mobility can assist in ensuring that EU citizens 'work to live' and improve their quality of life, as well as assist in strengthening social cohesion within Europe and assuring the sustainable development of European society in general. Mobility is a precondition to improved employment by 'leveraging all the untapped potential of EU citizens, strengthening their capacity to take up new and more qualified jobs, and enabling them to move to where the best job opportunities are available' (Turmann, 2004). Freedom of movement, therefore, has gained an important place in European policy-making, with geographical and job mobility moving centre stage in the Lisbon Strategy.

Yet, as this report reveals, both geographical and job mobility rates remain substantially lower in Europe than in the USA (the usual point of comparison): about 32% of the US population lives outside of the state in which they were born, while about 21% of the EU population has lived in a region or country other than their own (Krieger and Macías, 2006); the proportion of foreigners in the total population and in the labour force in the USA surpasses that of Europe (Turmann, 2004); average job tenure in the USA is lower than in any European country (Auer, 2005).

Perhaps in view of this, the year 2006 has been designated by the European Commission as European Year of Workers' Mobility. The main purpose of the initiative is to increase EU citizens' understanding of the benefits and cost of working in another EU country and the rights they hold should they choose to do so (geographical mobility), as well as inform citizens about making career changes (labour market or job mobility). This report brings together the most important descriptive results of the 2005 Eurobarometer mobility survey concerning these issues.

## **Popular support for mobility policies**

The survey data indicate that there is strong support for the EU policy objective on mobility. Geographical mobility is generally perceived as a 'good thing' for European integration by a solid majority of 62% of respondents. It is also predominantly perceived as a good thing for the employment-related domains of 'the labour market' and 'the economy', as well as for the 'individual'. On the other hand, Europeans indicate that geographical mobility is regarded as unfavourable for 'families'.

Although people generally believe that changing their place of residence would be good for European society at large, there is no associated behaviour at the individual level. The survey results confirm the moderate overall rate of mobility in Europe: only 4% of EU citizens have ever moved to another country in the EU and less than 3% to another country outside the EU. There is no indication of a mass migration in an enlarged Europe. Asked about their intentions to move in the future, only 3% of all EU citizens indicate that they might move to another EU country in the next five years. However, considerable variation does exist between countries.

The enlargement of the Union in 2004, with the addition of 10 new Member States, stimulated a debate in many EU countries on whether or not borders should be opened to allow the free movement of workers. In light of this, it is useful to reflect on whether the survey data point to a

massive future exodus from the NMS to the EU15. Past mobility within the EU is higher for people living in what is now the EU15 (5% of EU15 citizens have moved at least once within the EU, as against 1% of citizens from the NMS). However, the percentage of NMS citizens with intentions to move is higher (3% as against 5% in the EU15). Although this is an indication that there will be continuing migration from east to west within Europe, it above all indicates that geographical mobility within Europe has been, and is likely to remain, relatively low. Of course, the number of migrants might be more significant in absolute terms. This is clearly reflected in the case of Poland: about 7% of the population expect to move to another EU country in the next five years. With a population of some 40 million people, this would imply a considerable number of migrants.

Job mobility rates are somewhat higher than geographical mobility rates. This is quite reasonable since a change of job does not necessitate moving. About 8% of the working population changed jobs in the last year; about 32% changed jobs in the last five years; and about 43% think that they will change jobs in the next five years. Of course, these figures can be interpreted in quite the opposite way: 68% of all working Europeans still have the same employer as they had five years ago, while 57% think that they will still be in the same job in five years' time. When the figures are looked at in this way, it appears that Europeans prefer a stable job.

### **Are Europeans afraid of change?**

European policy stresses the importance of mobility. While EU citizens support this general idea, they are not likely to change. Europe is thus confronted with a paradox, because mobility decisions are not taken in isolation. The concept of 'bounded mobility' describes people optimising their geographical and job mobility within a predefined context (including their families, social networks and cultural context). As far as job mobility is concerned, about one out of three decisions to leave an employer are the consequence of people voluntarily choosing to improve their labour market position. But most of the time, the decision to change jobs is forced on people or else it is related to the search for a better balance between their professional and personal lives.

As far as geographical mobility is concerned, the decision to move across borders is often driven by employment-related opportunities; however, it is tempered by cultural and language-related barriers, by employment-related difficulties and above all by the social costs of leaving one's family, friends, colleagues and local community. Other significant factors that discourage moving include the transferability of pension rights, fear of not being able to find suitable housing and access to public facilities.

Perceived advantages and disadvantages of mobility are directly affected by life-course phases (e.g. the presence of young children, having a working partner or the career phase occupied). There is a straightforward relationship between age and different mobility indicators: young people change their place of residence more frequently and intend to do so again in the next five years, either within the same country or abroad. The older people are, the longer they stay in the same house. The same relationship is found for job mobility: most young people, at the start of their career, change employer often; they are also more inclined to believe that 'changing jobs every few years is good for people'. Older people stay longer in the same organisation and change employer less frequently; they also have few intentions of looking for another job in the near future.

The age effect can be interpreted in two ways. First, as suggested above, it confirms the life-course perspective, since it indicates that mobility behaviour occurs at specific life stages. A second interpretation would argue that the Eurobarometer survey data reveal a cohort effect on mobility behaviour, indicating that the younger cohorts are more mobile than the older. In this interpretation, the younger cohorts will remain more mobile in the coming decades (when they grow older) and mobility will rise over this period. This second interpretation would mean revisiting our conclusions about the levels of future European mobility. In the short term, mobility levels may remain moderate, but they would rise in the long term. However, the age selectivity of migration and job mobility has also been observed in previous empirical studies (Schlottmann and Herzog, 1984), which is why the present authors are more inclined to believe in the first interpretation.

### **Profile of mobile people**

Age is by far the most obvious parameter to explain both geographical and job mobility patterns. Breakdowns by gender and educational level display only slight differences, with better educated people showing the highest mobility. Single people, with or without children, are also more likely to be mobile, which is in line with the ‘bounded mobility’ thesis.

Additional descriptive statistics on job mobility suggest that mobility behaviour is apparent at the lower and upper boundaries of the labour market. More mobile respondents have fewer opportunities to keep using the same skills; in other words, changing employer appears to be an effective way of acquiring new and different skills. Thus job mobility seems to be a feature of ‘stronger’ groups in the labour market. However, several indicators show that job mobility tends to be a feature of the more vulnerable groups in the labour market. People who have a number of previous spells of unemployment, lone parents, blue-collar workers and people with temporary contracts – all these groups not only have above-average mobility levels, but are also more likely to face forced mobility through redundancy, expiry of employment contract or health reasons.

This segmentation of job mobility behaviour indicates that ‘risk management institutions’ (which are meant to guarantee a smooth adaptation of labour supply and demand, and reduce mobility costs to a negligible level) are not functioning properly. In a perfect transitional labour market, the cost of changing jobs (and on the wider scale, changing residence) is associated with equal profits, in the sense that people are more or less guaranteed a job of equal quality; people would not hesitate to take the risk of quitting a job (or a residence) and looking for a new one; job mobility would be frequent and people would decide to change from time to time regardless of their socio-economic background. This kind of labour market is, however, far from being realised: the reality is that people in a favourable position in the labour market are not inclined to change jobs when they are not forced to or when they are satisfied with their achieved labour market position. Transitions in the European labour market clearly ‘do not pay’ enough.

The reasons why people change residence again confirm the bounded mobility hypothesis. The most important reasons for moving are better housing, change of partner and a transition from renting to home-ownership. But it should be stressed that these factors most often result in short-distance moves (within the same region). The less frequent, long-distance moves (to another region or to another country) are more often related to the labour market; change of partner, however, is also an important motive. Future long-distance moves would be encouraged by work and income

factors, and by the prospect of discovering a new place or environment. Losing family ties or friends and having to learn a new language are the main factors that would discourage those contemplating a move abroad.

### National mobility profiles

The first main finding of this report relates to the complex relationship between the level of geographical mobility and job mobility. Both types of mobility occur within the same age groups, but also within the same countries. Countries with high geographical mobility levels tend to be countries where people change jobs more often. It seems that some countries generate the preconditions for mobility on different societal levels, whereas other countries create a more stable environment. According to Schmid (2006), welfare states that 'provide or organise risk-sharing for (un)employment' seem to have a similar system of organisation for residential issues. These societies probably have a wider application of social insurance, stimulating citizens to consider both dwellings and jobs as convertible means to a further end: citizens thus probably engage more in risky activities than they would in a different setting.

Based on two basic mobility indicators – geographical mobility and job mobility – the 25 EU Member States have been clustered into four groups for this report (see Figure 38):

- **Malta, Greece, Italy and Portugal, and Slovakia, Poland, Slovenia and Austria** – low residential and geographical mobility, and low job mobility;
- **Spain and Cyprus, and the Czech Republic and Hungary** – low residential mobility, but more occupational mobility;
- **Germany, France, Belgium, Luxembourg and Ireland** – more geographical mobility (particularly for Luxembourg and Ireland), but moderate job mobility;
- **Denmark, Sweden, and Finland, Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia, and the UK and Netherlands** – high geographical and job mobility.

For the EU15, a mobility-based grouping shows a remarkable resemblance to Esping-Andersen's welfare state typology (Esping-Andersen, 1990). High mobility rates are found in the social-democratic and liberal welfare regimes; high levels of geographical mobility, but moderate job mobility are found in the corporatist welfare regimes; the southern European regime is associated with low mobility. The 10 NMS all fit neatly into one of these four clusters. These findings call for a new 'extended' welfare state typology that includes all European countries. Such an intellectual exercise would certainly help the European Commission in the governance of the 25 Member States. As this simple clustering of countries shows, it is too simplistic these days to divide Europe into 10 'new' countries and 15 'old' countries: such a divide masks not only the great diversity within the EU15, but also within the 10 NMS.

A second finding of this report belies the argument that Europe is less mobile than the USA. Substantial differences in mobility have been found within Europe. In the eight countries that comprise the most mobile cluster, the average proportion of people who have moved after leaving the parental home is 90%; 86% of the working population have changed employer at least once in their career. In the least mobile cluster, the respective proportions are 67% and 63%.

## Desirable levels of mobility

Finally, the EU needs to reflect on how much mobility it wants. Too often, it is suggested that high mobility levels are preferable to low mobility levels. But increased or accelerated mobility may also have negative side-effects leading, for example, to the erosion of communities and local cohesion. In addition, dramatically higher mobility could rewrite the psychological contract between employer and employee: it may solve recruiting problems for employers (since candidates come from further afield), but it could also create new problems as employees change jobs more frequently.

Mobility in Europe, then, should not be maximised; rather, it should be *optimised*. The EU should focus not on how to reach a maximum level of mobility, but rather on how to realise the optimal mobility for workers, companies and societies. The findings in this report point to the benefits of better mobility rather than more mobility. If, for example, geographical mobility would result in a severe loss of cohesion within communities, it should not be promoted; equally, if people are forced to change one precarious job for another, job mobility is not something to be welcomed.

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*The Lisbon Strategy is based on making Europe a more competitive and dynamic economy, and creating better jobs. If these goals are to be achieved, Europe requires a skilled and adaptable labour force and a more open and accessible labour market. One way of facilitating this is to encourage greater geographical and labour market mobility among European workers. This report analyses the data collected from a 2005 Eurobarometer survey into geographical and labour market mobility in Europe. It looks at the extent of job mobility among Europeans and compares the profiles of those who change jobs with those who remain in the one occupation. It also examines the extent of long-distance geographical mobility in Europe, the reasons why European citizens have moved and their declared intentions to move in the future. It takes a life-course approach to the subject, tracing mobility patterns at key points in an individual's life: leaving the parental home, starting a household/family, first job, combining work and childcare, career moves and retirement. In particular, the report tackles the question of whether further migration of citizens from the new Member States to the EU15 is likely to happen.*


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ISBN 92-897-0955-3



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